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HOW THE DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF THE STEIN
THIRTEEN WILL AFFECT THE LITIGATION OF
CORPORATE CRIME AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE POLICIES AND EXPAND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Christopher McNamara*
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the first
appellate court in nearly thirty years to uphold the dismissal of criminal
indictments for a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violation. United
States v. Stein is a unique case that intertwines constitutional
interpretation, constitutional remedies, white collar crime, and U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) policy. The immediate effects of the Stein
decisions not only reflect the changing attitudes at the DOJ on how to
prosecute white collar crime but have simultaneously caused the DOJ to
implement such changes. As the Sixth Amendment has developed and
augmented, so has the interpretation of remedies when there is a right-to-
counsel violation. This Note explores the Stein decisions in light of existing
doctrines, and concludes that while certain parts of the decisions are
legally sound, other parts-right or wrong-may present direct challenges
to existing jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
But if it is in the government's interest that every defendant receive the
best possible representation, it cannot also be in the government's interest
to leave defendants naked to their enemies.I
These were the words used by Dennis G. Jacobs, the Chief Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when he handed down the
unanimous verdict of a three judge panel on August 28, 2008. In the
1. United States v. Stein (Stein P), 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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landmark decision of United States v. Stein,2 the Second Circuit upheld the
dismissal of indictments against thirteen former employees (the Stein
Thirteen) of the accounting magnate Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
(KPMG). 3 This Note will discuss the potential consequences that Stein's
holding will have on the Sixth Amendment and the avenues for relief
available to criminal defendants whose rights to counsel are violated. As is
the case with many constitutional violations, the remedy must fit the
violation; in other words, the right must fit the wrong. In the context of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, courts will look to tailor the remedy to
put the defendant in the same situation she would have been absent the
interference of the right to counsel. 4 Historically, this has meant anything
from dismissing an indictment, to a retrial, to absolutely no remedy
whatsoever.5  This Note will argue that the Stein decisions take an
expansive view of when the right to counsel attaches. Additionally, this
Note will analyze whether or not the courts also took an expansive view
regarding right-to-counsel violations, because the dismissal of a criminal
indictment is a very rare remedy for a right-to-counsel violation.6
The remedy for a constitutional violation will typically match the right.
For example, in a case of double jeopardy, the right is to not be tried again.7
Hence, the remedy, to not be tried for a second time, matches the right.
When illegal evidence is offered in a criminal case, thus violating the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the cure (the exclusion of the tainted
evidence) matches the defendant's right to not have illegal evidence used
against her.8 For criminal defendants, the hope is that a court will dismiss
an indictment or vacate a guilty finding with prejudice.9 Unsurprisingly,
dismissing an indictment is a worst case scenario for prosecutors and a
measure so definitive that judges are hesitant to make such a determination.
These remedies are rarely invoked because they preclude criminal
suspects-specifically those who have had indictments dismissed-from
ever facing trial and allow them to escape the inquiry of culpability. In fact,
this notion is so repugnant to courts that until the Stein decision, only one
appellate court in recent memory had ever dismissed criminal indictments
2. Id.
3. KPMG joins Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers to
comprise "The Big 4" accounting firms. See Professor Jane Kaplan, Drexel University
Accounting Department, http://www.pages.drexel.edu/-kaplanje/Big4_Firms.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009). See generally Posting of Amir Efrati to WSJ Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/12/01/government-throws-in-the-towel-on-kpmg/ (Dec. 1,
2008, 17:57 EST).
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
7. See infra Part I.A. 1.
8. See infra Part I.A. 1.
9. When a matter is dismissed with prejudice, as opposed to without prejudice, an
opposing party is precluded from refiling the matter. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Dismissals § 15
(2008).
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due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 10 In the Stein
case, the Second Circuit dismissed the indictments of thirteen former
partners and associates of KPMG I implicated in a fraudulent tax shelter
scheme in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) failed to collect on at
least $5 billion in taxes through schemes sold to 186 wealthy individuals,
all clients of KPMG. 12 This Note discusses relevant federal case law
involving remedies for Sixth Amendment violations, specifically those in
which the violation derived from prosecutorial misconduct or interference
in light of the Stein decision. From there, this Note reconciles the doctrines
and precedents that dictate such remedies. Part I explores remedies for
constitutional violations and provides some background information on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part II explores the conflict in light of
the Stein decision and compares the holdings with current jurisprudence.
Part III concludes that while many courts have refused to dismiss criminal
indictments for right-to-counsel violations, the decision to dismiss the
indictments for four of the defendants rested on sound legal theory;
however, it is questionable whether or not the remaining nine defendants
should have been excused from their criminal trials. The Conclusion to this
Note also analyzes how the Stein decision will affect the landscape of white
collar litigation, constitutional remedy interpretation, and the potential
expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
I. REMEDIES FOR GOVERNMENT WRONGDOING IN CRIMINAL CASES
Part L.A discusses the remedies for various constitutional violations. An
analysis of constitutional remedies-ranging from Fourth Amendment
search and seizure violations to the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial-will provide a sufficient background against which to scrutinize
right-to-counsel remedies. Part I.B details the development of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in federal courts. Part I.C discusses the
various occurrences that could give rise to a right-to-counsel violation and
what the corresponding remedy would be. Part I.D describes several U.S
Department of Justice (DOJ) policies that were relevant in Stein.
10. See United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
11. Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 (2008). One would think this is even more exceptional, as this
case has been hailed as the "largest tax fraud case in history." Lynnley Browning, Judge
Hands I.R.S. Victory in Tax Shelter, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2007, at B6.
12. See Howard Gleckman, Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, Inside the KPMG Mess,
Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/
nf2005091_2144_db016.htm.
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A. Remedies Generally
1. Remedies for Constitutional Violations
There are numerous tools a court may use to remedy a constitutional
violation, including the dismissal of a case with or without prejudice,
injunctive relief, attorney sanctions,13 and civil damage actions. 14
The type of remedy differs depending on the nature of the violation and
the applicable constitutional right. For example, suppressing evidence
obtained during an illegal search and seizure will often suffice under the
auspices of the Fourth Amendment. 15 The U.S. Supreme Court found in
United States v. Calandra16 that the exclusionary rule' 7 is implemented not
as a remedy deriving from personal freedom but as a deterrent against
future unlawful government conduct, thereby safeguarding constitutionally
protected Fourth Amendment rights. 18 The courts will seek to level the
playing field so that the government cannot use the fruits from the
proverbial poisonous tree as evidence against a defendant in a criminal
proceeding. 19 This legal metaphor posits that evidence obtained from an
illegal search or seizure is barred by the exclusionary rule and cannot be
used against a defendant during a criminal trial; both the "tree" and its
13. See FED R. CIV. P. 11 (c).
14. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
15. The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. However, there are limitations to the suppression of evidence from
an illegal search. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that a violation of
the "knock-and-announce" rule did not necessitate the suppression of all evidence found in
the search); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (finding that where the trial record
presents a direct conflict in testimony regarding the nature of a search, courts will not resolve
the conflict based on the version of the facts surrounding the warrant's execution most
favorable to the prosecution).
16. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
17. See generally RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND
RELATED AREAS 1325-69 (2d ed. 1991).
18. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-52 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to questions
in front of a grand jury); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that
marijuana presented as evidence was not suppressed because the flawed warrant stemmed
from a clerical error of a court employee, and such a mistake fell within the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule). Courts will not necessarily suppress the evidence
obtained from a good faith but unconstitutional search. The U.S. Supreme Court in Leon v.
United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), alleviated some of the pressure for law enforcement
officers by holding that an exception to the exclusionary rule would occur when a police
officer, in good faith, conducted a search that he subjectively believed was legal at the time,
and subsequently found out was technically flawed.
19. Arizona, 514 U.S. at 10 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906).
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
"fruit" are excluded. 20 Often refusing to go as far as dismissing the
indictment, courts will allow criminal litigation to proceed, absent the
illegal evidence. 2' In United States v. Blue,22 the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss a criminal claim against him, citing that introducing his
testimony from a related matter would violate his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. 23 The Court found that the circumstances of the
case did not require so drastic a step as barring the litigation altogether. 24
In the landmark Fifth Amendment case, Miranda v. Arizona,25 the Court
held that where a defendant's statements were obtained during
"incommunicado" interrogation in a custodial environment, without full
warning of his constitutional rights, such statements would be held
inadmissible as they violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 26 However, when a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are
violated due to an attempt to sidestep the Double Jeopardy Clause, a court
will bar the litigation entirely.27
While this Note will focus on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is
worth mentioning another right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment: the
right to a speedy trial. 28 While the Constitution contains no explicit remedy
for this violation, courts have interpreted a violation of the right to a speedy
trial to require a dismissal of the charges. 29 Such interpretation has been
codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 30 This remedy is
20. See generally Gary D. Spivey, Comment, 'Fruit of the Poisonous Tree' Doctrine
Excluding Evidence Derived from Information Gained in Illegal Search, 43 A.L.R. 3d 385
(1972).
21. See generally Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
22. 384 U.S. 251 (1966). In United States v. Blue, the Court reversed the district court's
dismissal of the indictment and held that the defendant was free to pursue his Fifth
Amendment claims through motions to suppress and objections to evidence. Id. at 256.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides,
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
24. Blue, 384 U.S. at 255.
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. Id. at 469-79.
27. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (holding that a verdict of not
guilty, whether found by judge or jury, "absolutely shields the defendant from retrial"); Ball
v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) (finding that a verdict of acquittal for murder is a
bar to a second indictment for the same murder).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (holding that the
dismissal of a guilty finding is the only appropriate remedy for deprivation of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the unreasonable emotional strain that a delay can
have on a defendant, as well as the potential of adversely affecting the ability to present a
defense and the concern of oppressive incarceration).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. See generally Speedy Trial, GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC.
369 (2008) (discussing issues and rights relating to the guarantee of a speedy trial).
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criticized as too absolute or "unsatisfactorily severe" and could ultimately
lead to dire consequences as a person who "may be guilty of a serious crime
will go free, without having been tried."'31 However, the Court in Strunk v.
United States32 countered that "such severe remedies are not unique in the
application of constitutional standards." 33 Notably, the Court in Strunk had
no doubt that the defendant was guilty; in fact, he had confessed the crime
to a federal agent while incarcerated.34  Jurists may find this result
troubling, but the Court held that it is crucial to the judicial process that a
criminal defendant's rights are upheld, so as to deter future unlawful
government actions. 35
2. Ethical Misconduct
While the Stein decisions are interesting from a constitutional
perspective, this perspective is inextricably intertwined with the
prosecutorial misconduct that led to the constitutional violations. Courts
have the ability to rectify government interference with the procedural and
substantive steps of litigation through various legal mechanisms:
entrapment, 36 due process, 37 and the application of supervisory powers.38
In Hampton v. United States,39 the Court recognized that "[t]he limitations
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only
when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of
the Defendant. Here... the police, the Government informant, and the
defendant acted in concert with one another." 40  Entrapment is a valid
defense when the police infiltrate the mind of the innocent man to commit a
crime he would not have otherwise committed but for the police
instigation. 41
31. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
32. 412 U.S. 434.
33. Id. at 439.
34. Id. at 436.
35. See, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
36. Entrapment is "[a] law-enforcement officer's or government agent's inducement of a
person to commit a crime, by means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to later
bring a criminal prosecution against that person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed.
2004).
37. Due Process is "[t]he conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and
principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right
to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case." Id. at 538-39.
38. A court may use its supervisory power to remedy a constitutional or statutory
violation and preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on the appropriate
considerations when considered by a jury and to deter future illegal acts. See United States v.
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors'
Ethics Codes, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461, 464 (2009) (positing that "[c]ourts seldom
use supervisory powers to usurp the prosecutorial charging decision").
39. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
40. Id. at 490.
41. Id. The Court elaborates by saying that in the case of a concerted criminal enterprise
between the willing defendant and the police, the equally culpable defendant will not be
afforded a dismissal, but rather the appropriate remedy will be the prosecution of the
culpable police officers. Id.; see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (finding
2009]
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A court usually cannot exercise its inherenf 2 federal supervisory power 43
to evade its obligation to assess trial court errors of prejudice.44
Furthermore, courts must exercise caution when invoking supervisory
powers. 45 In United States v. Williams,4 6 the Court held that the federal
supervisory power of the court is used not only to hone the truth-finding
process at trial, but also to prevent litigants from violating the substantive
and procedural processes of the trial.47 The Court reiterated its holding in
McNabb v. United States,4 8 finding that supervisory powers can be used to
implement a remedy for a violation of a recognized right, to preserve
judicial integrity, and to deter future illegal conduct. 49 Furthermore, Bank
of Nova Scotia v. United States50 expanded supervisory powers to include
indictment dismissal due to prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury,
but only when the misconduct "'substantially influenced the grand jury's
decision to indict"' or if there was "'grave doubt"' that the decision to
indict was independent of the misconduct.5 1
In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski
considered a situation involving prosecutorial misconduct.52 During trial,
the government attorney claimed that a witness did not testify in a drug case
that even where a defendant denies one or more of the elements to the crime for which he is
accused, he is still entitled to an entrapment jury instruction where there is sufficient
evidence to show that a reasonable juror could find entrapment); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973) (finding that law enforcement officers' involvement in the procedural
commission of certain crimes is not proscribed and will not violate a defendant's Fifth
Amendment due process rights so long as the officer does not implant the criminally
punishable design in the defendant's head). But see United States v. Nava-Salazar, 30 F.3d
788 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that government agents who worked closely with defendants in
a drug ring, even providing them with transportation to enable the smuggling of cocaine into
the United States and then within it, did not meet the standard of outrageous conduct
necessary for a due process violation).
42. "On several occasions the Supreme Court has relied on a claimed inherent
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts to reverse
convictions obtained as a result of official illegality." ALLEN & KUHNs, supra note 17, at
936.
43. See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 13 (2008).
44. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 81 (2003) (citing Bank of N.S. v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988)).
45. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991).
46. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
47. See id. at 45-46.
48. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
49. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983); see also Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (finding that the Court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction
"to see that the waters of justice are not polluted"); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398-99 (1914) (reversing the lower court when finding a combination of government
misconduct and Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations).
50. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
51. Id. at 256 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)); see Douglas
P. Currier, Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers To Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-
A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1100 (1984) (arguing
that "[s]upervisory powers should be granted to courts so they may dismiss grand jury
indictments in cases of prosecutorial misconduct").
52. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993).
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because he had a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 53
Unbeknownst to the jury, the person in question was a government witness;
that is, he had cooperated with the U.S. Attorney's Office and, in exchange
for written testimony, he received either immunity or a favorable plea
bargain. 54 The Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutor's misstatement was
duplicitous and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 55 Judge Kozinski
vacated the guilty verdict and remanded the matter to the district court.56
B. What Is the Right to Counsel and When Does It Attach?
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' 57  The Supreme Court has
recognized that the right to counsel is so pivotal to the criminal justice
system that it is a "fundamental" right. 58
1. Developing the "Right" in Federal Court
The Court in Gideon v. Wainwright59 postulated, "The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."'60 In Johnson v.
Zerbst,61 the Court, through the pen of Justice Hugo Black, ruled that the
Sixth Amendment prevented federal courts from depriving the accused of
his right to counsel, unless the right was properly waived.62 The Court in
Powell v. Alabama63 stated that the
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.... If charged with [a]
crime, [the nonrepresented defendant] is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.64
53. Id. at 1317.
54. See id. at 1323-24.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1325.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
58. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 344. See generally Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v.
Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 367 (2004).
61. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
62. Id. at 463.
63. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
64. Id. at 68-69.
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The Court in Powell, or "The Scottsboro Boys Trials, '65 for the first time
recognized the possibility that this right could be of a fundamental nature.66
Thirty years later, the Court reasoned in Gideon that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel should be applied to citizens of the several states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 Again writing for the Court, Justice Black
built upon the reasoning in Powell and Betts v. Brady.68 In Powell, the
Court opined that the right to counsel was of a fundamental nature. 69 Then
in Betts, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment makes it
obligatory on the states to recognize the fundamental rights of a fair judicial
process. 70 The Betts Court however, refused to recognize the right to
counsel as one of those fundamental rights. 71 Justice Black found that
lawyers were essential to criminal proceedings as evinced by the vast sums
of money that the government and those defendants with financial means
expend on retaining the best lawyers. 72 Indeed, the Court in Gideon said
that these are the "strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. '73
Viewed now as a necessity, subsequent courts have expanded the role of
defense lawyers, to include not only advocacy in court but also presence
during police lineups, interrogation, and all other matters relating to a
criminal proceeding once the government shifts from investigator to
adversary. 74 Another component of the right to counsel affords the accused
the option of self-representation. 75 While the Court in Wheat v. United
States76 reaffirmed the right of self-representation, it refused to extend this
right to allow a defendant to be represented by another lay person. 77
In Wheat, the Court issued three legitimate caveats that honed the right to
counsel: A representative must be a member of the bar. She must be
someone that the defendant can afford or who, alternatively, will represent
the defendant. Also, the representative must not have a conflict of interest,
65. See Nannette Jolivette Brown, 75th Anniversary of Powell v. Alabama
Commemorated, LA. B.J., June/July 2008, at 19, 19 (2008).
66. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963); see, e.g., Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975) (reaffirming that the Fourteenth Amendment assures that the
fundamental right of fairness is applicable to the states).
68. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
69. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
70. Betts, 316 U.S. at 473.
71. Id. at 461-66.
72. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
73. Id.
74. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229-40 (1967).
75. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
76. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
77. Id. at 159 n.3; see also Lynsey Morris Barron, Comment, Right to Counsel Denied.-
Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Attorney Fee Agreements, and the Sixth Amendment, 58
EMORY L.J. 1265, 1295-97 (2009) (advocating a clear constitutional test for Sixth
Amendment violations, derived in part from the "Wheat Test").
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that is, a previous or ongoing relationship with the opposition, including the
government. 78
Beyond the actual text of the Sixth Amendment, courts have recognized
the right to court-appointed counsel for indigents, 79 but the means by which
a defendant can secure her counsel of choice has become a contested
issue.80 In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,81 the Court
recognized that a defendant can secure an attorney who is affordable or,
alternatively, will represent him despite lack of funds. 82 However, there are
limitations to this right. Wheat outlined at least three circumstances in
which a criminal defendant could not secure the counsel of her choosing. 83
The Court in Wheat did not address whether a defendant could secure her
desired attorney at the expense of a third party. The Court in United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez84 did not take issue with the fact that the defendant's
family hired his initial attorney. There is Supreme Court case law that
establishes a defendant should have "a fair opportunity to secure counsel of
his own choice." 85  Several lower courts have extended considerable
latitude to a defendant in her attempt to secure such counsel. For example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the Sixth
Amendment enables a defendant to retain counsel either through her own
funds or through the aid of family and friends. 86 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit declared that a defendant had a qualified right to use wholly
legitimate funds in securing the counsel of his choice. 87 "Qualified" being
the operative word, a criminal defendant does not have the right to use
tainted funds to secure defense counsel. 88
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Caplin found that a defendant's right to
counsel had not been violated by a federal statute authorizing the
government to seize funds acquired through drug enterprises. 89  The
defendant argued that funds allocated to pay his attorney fell outside the
bounds of the assets that the government could legally seize.90  The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, finding that a
defendant does not have a right to spend tainted money on an attorney, even
though the defendant is in possession of the money and has no other funds
to secure counsel. 91 The property argument is that while the defendant may
have been in possession of the funds, they really belong to the government
78. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
79. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
80. See infra Part I.C.4.
81. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
82. Id. at 624-25.
83. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
84. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
85. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
86. United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973).
87. United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 805 (4th Cir. 2001).
88. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989).
89. Id. at 632.
90. Id. at 621.
91. Id. at 626-30.
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by way of forfeiture laws.92 On the same day the Court decided Caplin, it
issued a decision on another forfeiture case, United States v. Monsanto.93
The concurring opinion in Monsanto underscored the Court's view that
federal drug forfeiture statutes cannot be used as a constitutional shield by a
defendant wishing to allocate frozen assets to acquire an attorney. 94
2. When Does the Right to Counsel Attach?
The Court has held that during critical stages of the pretrial
proceedings-from arraignment to strategic consultations to trial
preparation-the right to counsel is as necessary and protected as in the
actual trial. 95 In Kirby v. Illinois,96 the Court seized the opportunity to
determine when exactly the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
The Court rationalized that, since the initiation of judicial criminal
proceedings is more than a "mere formalism," the proper analysis should be
whether the government has committed to prosecute the defendant. Only
then, once the adversarial positions have been drawn, will the defendant be
entitled to counsel. 9 7
The Court later expanded right-to-counsel jurisprudence by advancing
that the accused need not stand alone at any stage of the prosecution,
whether it is formal or informal, in or out of court, as long as counsel's
absence could have an adverse effect on the fairness of the impending
trial. 98 The Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was violated when neither he nor his attorney was notified of a
lineup and that counsel's presence at said lineup was required absent an
intelligent waiver. 99 Once the right to counsel has attached, it remains for
all "critical stages" of the prosecution.100
92. Id. at 624-33; see also John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REv.
959, 989 (2009) (arguing that despite the constitutionality of forfeiture laws, they still create
a roadblock in obtaining private defense counsel).
93. 491 U.S. 600 (1989). The Court found that, for the same reasons it emphasized in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights cannot be said to be unduly burdened when the Government seizes assets to be used,
in part, to retain an attorney. Id. at 614.
94. "We rely on our conclusion in [Caplin] to dispose of the similar constitutional
claims raised by respondent here." Id. at 614.
95. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
96. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
97. Id. at 688-89; see, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583-84
(2008) (noting that when a defendant appears before a magistrate judge and learns of the
charges against him, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches as this is the initiation of
the adversarial proceedings); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-93 (1984)
(holding that the right to appointed counsel does not attach before the institution of adversary
judicial proceedings).
98. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
99. Id. at 237.
100. United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731-32 (E.D. Va. 2007). The court
held that interference with counsel before the right is triggered preindictment can have a
"pernicious effect" on the postindictment rights of the defendant. Id. at 734-35; see also
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding that there will be a presumption
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C. Remedies for a Violation of the Right to Counsel
The right to counsel can be violated in a number of different ways:
government interference, 101 judicial interference, 10 2 disqualification of the
defense attorney, 10 3 and ineffective counsel. 10 4 Generally speaking, the
proper remedy for a violation of the right to counsel is "tailored to the
injury suffered from the constitutional violation [and therefore does not]
unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." 10 5  While Stein concerns
Sixth Amendment infringements caused by prosecutorial interference, 10 6 it
is important to understand other instances of right-to-counsel violations and
their respective remedies.
1. Government Interference
A majority of cases arising out of a potential right-to-counsel violation
involve the direct or indirect interference with counsel by a government
agent, whether it be a prosecutor, a police officer, or even a jailhouse
informant. 10 7 The current jurisprudence on right-to-counsel remedies is
best articulated in United States v. Morrison:10 8 "remedies should be
tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should
not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." 10 9  In Morrison, the
interference occurred when federal agents, aware that the accused was
represented by counsel, met with her outside the presence of counsel to
acquire her cooperation in a related investigation. 10 During the meeting,
the agents disparaged the accused's chosen counsel, claiming that she
"would gain various benefits if she cooperated but would face a stiff jail
term if she did not."' Morrison refused to cooperate and continued to be
represented by her attorney. 112 Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the government interfered with her
right to counsel. 113 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that a showing of prejudice or tangible effect on defendant's
representation was unnecessary to the constitutional violation, and that the
that a trial was unfair where the defendant was denied access to counsel at "a critical stage of
his trial"). But see Nishchay H. Maskay, Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal
Restrictions on the Indemnification ofAttorneys'Fees, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 523 (2007).
101. See infra Part I.C.1.
102. See infra Part I.C.2.
103. See infra Part I.C.4.
104. See infra Part I.C.3.
105. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
106. See infra Part II.A.2.
107. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (defendant's confession was
coerced by inmate, a government informant, when the latter insisted on the former's
confession in exchange for protection against fellow inmates).
108. 449 U.S. 361.
109. Id. at 364.
110. Id. at 362-63.
111. Id. at 362.
112. Id. at 363.
113. Id.
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dismissal of the indictment would be the appropriate remedy. 14 However,
the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court conceded that it had a history of
being responsive to proven cases of government interference, 115 but
concluded that the Third Circuit's remedy went too far. The Morrison
Court discerned the main issue concerning dismissals: the "preserv[ation]
[of] society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. ' 116 The
Court explained that in order for there to be any remedy, there must be a
violation coupled with a showing of prejudice. 117 Morrison is famous for
the "neutralize the taint" mentality; 118 essentially, fix the wrong-nothing
more and nothing less. The wrinkle in Morrison was that there was no
showing of harm; though there was one inappropriate conversation between
the government agents and the represented defendant, 119 there was no
demonstration that the conversation had an adverse effect on Morrison's
right to counsel. 120 Additionally, Justice Byron White insisted, where the
prosecution has improperly acquired incriminating evidence against the
criminal defendant absent the presence of counsel, such information shall
be suppressed or a new trial will be ordered if the evidence has been
wrongly admitted. 121  Moreover, absent demonstrable prejudice or a
substantial threat of prejudice, the dismissal of an indictment is "plainly
inappropriate."'122
114, United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
115. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (holding that defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated by a corporeal identification that occurred
subsequent to the initiation of adversarial proceedings and in the absence of counsel); Geders
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding that a right-to-counsel violation occurred when
defendant was precluded from meeting with his attorney during a seventeen-hour recess
between his direct and cross-examination); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864-65
(1975) (finding a violation where statutory scheme empowered a judge in a nonjury trial to
decide whether or not to hear closing statements from defense counsel); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967) (finding that a postindictment lineup was a critical stage
in proceeding and that the absence of an attorney, unless properly waived, constituted a
violation of the right to counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964)
(finding a violation to the right to counsel when codefendant tape recorded conversations
postindictment with the defendant without the presence of the defendant's attorney or
knowledge of the state action). But see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967)
(holding that pretrial handwriting sample does not violate right to counsel because it was
submitted at a stage that was not "critical" to the proceeding. The Court in United States v.
Morrison reasoned that the remedy "characteristically imposed" for right-to-counsel
violations "is not to dismiss the indictment but to suppress the evidence or to order a new
trial." Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.
116. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 365.
119. The Court explicitly held that while it did not condone the conduct of the
government agents, the proposed remedy by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
was inappropriate if the alleged violation had no adverse effects on the criminal defendant.
Id at 367.
120. Id. at 366.
121. Id. at 365-66.
122. Id. at 365. But see Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp:
Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1159 (1984).
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In Weatherford v. Bursey,123 a civil damages case brought against a
testifying witness during the plaintiff's criminal trial, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated when the defendant, an
undercover officer, was present during meetings with the plaintiff and his
attorney. 124 At the time of the arrest and ensuing conversations, the
plaintiff was not aware that his codefendant was in fact an undercover
agent. 125 The agent was present during two pretrial meetings, where
strategy was discussed with the plaintiff and his attorney.126 The defendant,
Jack Weatherford, was called as a witness and testified against plaintiff,
Brett Allen Bursey. 127 While testifying, the defendant did not discuss the
contents from either of the two pretrial meetings that he attended.128 The
Court not only found that Weatherford did not interfere with the attorney-
client relationship, as he was invited to the meetings, but also established
that there is no per se rule preventing government agents from being present
during a conversation between the accused and his defense counsel.' 29
In Massiah v. United States,130 the defendant's drug conviction was
overturned following the use of incriminating statements he made in the
absence of his attorney.131 While released on bail, the defendant engaged in
what he believed to be a private conversation with his codefendant, Jesse
Colson. 132 Unknown to the defendant, Colson had agreed to cooperate with
the government against Winston Massiah.' 33 Colson arranged to have a
listening device installed in his car, and one night after Massiah was
released on bail, the two had a conversation that was monitored by
government agents. 134 Murphy, the federal agent who monitored the
conversation, testified at trial to the contents of the discussion. 135 The
Court found this to be a violation of Massiah's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. 136 The Court said the incriminating statements were explicitly
elicited by the government, as evinced by its relationship with Colson, with
full knowledge that defendant Massiah was represented by counsel. 137
Essentially, the government conduct violated a fundamental notion of
123. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
124. Id. at 558.
125. Id. at 547-49.
126. Id. at 547-48.
127. Id. at 549.
128. Id. at 548-49.
129. Id. at 551-54. In a combative dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall chastised his
brethren for jeopardizing two independent constitutional values: (1) the integrity of the
adversarial system; and (2) criminal defendants' rights to effective assistance of counsel. He
argued that a client will be reluctant to confide in his attorney if there is a possibility that the
conversation could potentially be used against him. Id. at 562-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
131. Id. at 207.
132. Id. at 203.
133. Id. at 202.
134. Id. at 203.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 203-07.
137. Id. at 204.
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fairness and undermined the right of the indicted defendant to consult with
his attorney. 138 In a pointed dissent, Justice White, who would go on to pen
the majority opinion in Morrison,139 claimed that there had been no
extensive coercion in this situation and that Massiah made such comments
on his own volition outside of custody. 140
In a case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Lopez,14 the defendant
challenged his guilty verdict 142 alleging prosecutorial interference with his
right to counsel. After indictment, Jose Lopez hired Barry Tarlow as his
attorney. 143 Tarlow advised Lopez that he believed there was a viable
defense and that it was Tarlow's general policy not to "cooperate" with the
government in exchange for pleading to a lesser charge. 44  Lopez's
codefendant, Antonio Escobedo, had retained his own attorney, James A.
Twitty.145 Twitty, unlike Tarlow, was eager to negotiate a plea on behalf of
his client, and Lopez was inclined to engage in plea negotiations because he
was concerned that his children were being abused while he was
incarcerated. 46 Lopez, however, did not want to retain a separate attorney
to negotiate a plea for him; he was hesitant to spend the additional money
and potentially lose the services of Tarlow at trial. 147 Consistent with
Lopez's wishes, Twitty contacted the prosecutor, Lyons, and informed him
of the situation. 148 Lyons realized the potential problems arising from
meeting with a criminal defendant without counsel 149 and looked to
circumvent these issues by contacting the judge ex parte. 150 The district
court judge referred Lyons to a magistrate judge, who conducted an in
camera interview with Lopez each time Lyons planned on meeting with
him outside the presence of counsel.' 51 The magistrate judge made sure
that Lopez understood he would be representing himself during the plea
negotiations with the prosecutor. 152 Tarlow discovered through a third
party what his client and the prosecutor did behind his back. 153
Subsequently, Tarlow withdrew his representation of Lopez. 54 Lopez
138. Id. at 204-06.
139. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
140. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 211-12 (White, J., dissenting).
141. 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
142. Jose Lopez was convicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of
cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and for aiding and
abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. at 1456.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Lopez wanted to keep Barry Tarlow as his attorney in case the plea negotiations
were unsuccessful and the case went to trial. Id. at 1456-57.
148. Id. at 1457.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id
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retained substitute counsel and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
alleging a Sixth Amendment violation.155
The district court did not find a right-to-counsel violation because Lopez
was able to find a substitute attorney. 156 However, the court found that the
prosecutor's conduct interfered with Lopez's right to counsel of his
choice. 157 Invoking its supervisory powers, the district court dismissed the
indictment against Lopez, finding that less drastic remedies would not cure
the wrong in this case. 158 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that it was
within the district court's power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial
interference, explaining that fairness in the criminal justice system required
fair dealing and ethical conduct in the legal profession. 159 However, the
Ninth Circuit advanced its holding in United States v. Owen, 160 reiterating
that a dismissal of indictment is appropriate when there is "'some prejudice
to the accused by virtue of the alleged acts of misconduct.""' 6 1 The Ninth
Circuit held that despite Lyons' malfeasance, Lopez was not prejudiced
since he was able to hire replacement counsel who was "'very able and
[willing to] provide him with outstanding representation."" 162
2. Judicial Interference
While Lopez involved primarily prosecutorial misconduct, the district
judge had some role, being that he allowed Lyons to question Lopez outside
the presence of counsel. 163 While the judicial behavior in Lopez may be
perceived as an indirect cause to the violation, it begs the question, what
happens when a judge improperly interferes with the right to counsel?
Judicial interference with a defendant's right to counsel can occur in any
number of ways. In Geders v. United States,164 the Court found a
constitutional violation stemming from the trial court's order depriving the
defendant from consulting with his counsel during a seventeen-hour
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1458.
157. Id. The court reasoned that although the prosecutor received the district court's
permission, he misled the court because he claimed the reason Lopez needed to meet outside
the presence of counsel was that he believed Tarlow was being paid by a drug ring and that
Lopez's family could be in danger. However, the prosecutor knew, as James A. Twitty
explicitly told him, that the reason Lopez wanted to engage in negotiations was because he
believed Tarlow would not be useful in a plea negotiation. Id. at 1457.
158. Id. at 1458.
159. Id. at 1463; see, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (holding that
federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that lawyers conduct themselves in
such a way as is consistent with legal ethics and procedural fairness); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that when a prosecutor suppresses evidence that is favorable
to the accused at trial, he violates the defendant's right to due process, which is a
constitutional safeguard that ensures the fundamental fairness of trials).
160. 580 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1978).
161. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Owen, 580 F.2d at 367).
162. Id. at 1464 (quoting United States v. Lopez 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1456 (N.D. Cal.
1991), vacated, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993)).
163. Id. at 1457.
164. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
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overnight recess. 165 The Court, while acknowledging that it is within
judicial discretion to sequester witnesses, distinguished this situation
because John Geders was not only a witness, but the defendant. 166 Chief
Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, recognized that it is
commonplace for an attorney to discuss strategy and key trial objectives
with her client during recesses, especially an overnight recess. 167
Furthermore, the Chief Justice said, "the role of counsel is important
precisely because ordinarily a defendant is ill-equipped to understand and
deal with the trial process without a lawyer's guidance." 168 This statement
is consistent with the principle articulated in Brooks v. Tennessee.169 In
Brooks, the Court struck down a Tennessee statute that required a criminal
defendant to testify before any other defense witness. 170 Writing for a
divided Court, Justice William Brennan emphasized that the right to
counsel is inextricable from the right to put on a defense. 171 Lawyers are
skilled and trained to weigh evidence and the strength of a given case.
Requiring the defendant to testify at the outset of the defense, Justice
Brennan said, would be to remove the "guiding hand of counsel" and thus
violate a defendant's constitutional rights. 172
The Court was provided with a fact pattern akin to a Geders-Brooks
hybrid of statutory law and judicial discretion in Herring v. New York.173
Clifford Herring was charged with first and third degree attempted
robbery. 174 The judge was afforded the discretion, under a state statute, 175
to waive closing remarks, or summations, in his capacity as the fact
finder. 176 The Court found that presenting a final argument before a judge
in a nonjury trial is a basic right and that the proscription of this right
violated a defendant's ability to defend himself.177 The Court recognized a
judge's latitude in restricting a closing remark either for redundancy or in
light of time restrictions. It noted, however, that a judge must respect that
closing statements are pivotal in that they are the only time in the trial
165. Id. at 91.
166. Id. at 87-88.
167. Id. at 88-89.
168. Id. at 88.
169. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
170. Id. at 606.
171. Id. at 612-13.
172. Id. at 613.
173. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
174. Id. at 854.
175. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.20(3)(c) (McKinney 1971).
176. This was a case where the defendant waived his right to a trial by jury, and
undertook the option to have the judge act as the sole fact finder. Herring, 422 U.S. at 854.
Following the ruling in Herring v. New York, New York amended the law so that judges
must allow all parties the opportunity to present summations as if they were in front of a
jury. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.20(3)(c) (McKinney 2002).
177. Herring, 422 U.S. at 858-59. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975) (holding that a criminal defendant has the right to act as his own attorney).
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where both sides can weigh all of the evidence and point out potential
strengths and weaknesses. 178
The Court, in both Geders and in Herring, sent the cases back down to
the lower federal courts. In Geders, the Court held that an order precluding
a criminal defendant from consulting with his attorney between the direct
and cross-examination parts of the trial impinged on his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 179 In Herring, the Court found that the denial of the
defendant's rights under the New York statute mandated vacating the guilty
verdict and remanded the matter back down to the lower court. 180
3. Ineffective Counsel
In addition to government and judicial interference with the right to
counsel, a defendant may have grounds for reversal deriving from the
ineffectiveness of her lawyer at trial. The applicable standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel was defined in Strickland v.
Washington.181 The constitutional threshold for ineffective assistance of
counsel is whether the attorney's conduct so undermines the proper
function the adversarial system serves that the outcome at trial cannot be
perceived as a just result. 182 To reverse a conviction on the grounds of
ineffective counsel, a defendant must demonstrate two components: first,
that the attorney's errors were so egregious that the attorney could not
qualify as "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment; 183 second, that the
attorney's performance was sufficiently deficient as to directly prejudice the
case, thus undermining the adversary process and enabling an unjust
result.184 As the Strickland Court and numerous others observe, the judicial
inquiry must be "highly deferential" to the attorney 185 because different
attorneys will react differently to similar situations. 186 The Strickland
standard presumes that an attorney is competent, especially when the
attorney is experienced. 187 However, as the Court articulated in United
States v. Cronic, 88 experience is not dispositive when analyzing an
ineffective counsel allegation. 89
178. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862.
179. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91-92 (1976).
180. Herring, 422 U.S. at 864-65.
181. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See generally Paul F. Wessell, Right to Counsel, Thirteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1982-1983, 72 GEO. L.J. 525, 529-34 (1983).
182. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.
183. Id. at 687.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 689.
186. See id at 689 (discussing how even expert criminal defense attorneys would not
uniformly represent a client in the same way).
187. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783-96 (1987); Chandler v. United States, 218
F.3d 1305, 1316 (1 th Cir. 2000).
188. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
189. See id. at 665.
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Writing for the Court in Cronic, Justice Stevens asserted that the defense
counsel, a young attorney who specialized in real estate and was unfamiliar
with criminal law, had a rebuttable presumption of competence. 190 This
again illustrates the deference paid to attorneys in the criminal justice
system. The lawyer in Cronic, while young and inexperienced, also only
had twenty-five days to prepare for the case after the withdrawal of the
previous attorney. 191 Still, Justice Stevens maintained, there can be no
finding of ineffective counsel to warrant a reversal of conviction absent a
showing of ineffectiveness, and inexperience alone does not permit a
declaration of ineffectiveness. 192
4. Disqualification of the Chosen Attorney
While courts inquire whether or not a chosen attorney performed
competently, an interesting question is posed when a lower court prohibits
the defendant's chosen attorney from representing the client. There is
ample law that allows a court to remove an attorney from a criminal case
for legitimate reasons. Removal can occur either directly or indirectly. A
paradigmatic example involving direct removal of counsel-a court's
decision to disqualify a specific attorney or attorneys from a proceeding-is
the scenario of "house counsel" for organized crime families. 193 In United
States v. Gotti,194 a case before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, Judge Israel Glasser mandated that three defense
attorneys who had routinely and continually represented alleged mob
members be disqualified. 195 Judge Glasser found that this disqualification
was required for at least two reasons. First, the attorneys continued
participation would create a conflict of interest, as their former clients
would be testifying against current clients on behalf of the government. 196
Additionally, the disqualification of the attorneys was required because of
their participation in the underlying obstruction of justice charge: the court
had trouble foreseeing a way in which the two attorneys would not be called
to testify, and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
counselor from acting as a witness against his client because of the inability
to cross-examine. 197 Judge Glasser appreciated the finality of his decision,
conceding that he "balanced the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of their choice against the grave peril the continued representation
by those counsel poses to the integrity of the trial process."' 198
190. Id. at 657-58.
191. Id. at 664-65.
192. See id. at 666.
193. See, e.g., LoCascio v. United States, 395 F.3d 51, 56 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).
194. 771 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
195. Id. at 567.
196. Id. at 563.
197. Id. at 565; see MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1980).
198. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. at 566.
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In addition to a court ordered attorney disqualification, a lawyer can
request to withdraw as counsel and be removed from the case if there is
adequate justification.1 99  One example of a reasonable request for
withdrawal is when the client does not compensate her attorney. 200 In
Caplin, the defendant, Christopher Reckmeyer, was charged with a
multicount indictment for running a large drug importation and distribution
scheme. 20 1 Reckmeyer's law firm challenged the constitutionality of a
federal forfeiture statute,202 which required the forfeiture of illegally
obtained assets that Reckmeyer sought to use to fund his defense.20 3 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in finding that the law was unconstitutional. 20 4 However, on
rehearing, the Fourth Circuit reversed.20 5 The Court affirmed the decision
of the Fourth Circuit in declaring that the law firm had no property claims
in the forfeited assets and that the law did not violate the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 206 The Court held that this was not a violation of the right
to counsel because, even though Reckmeyer sought to use illegitimate funds
for a legitimate purpose (i.e., to pay his lawyer), such funds were no longer
his property, and a defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to spend a
third party's (in this case, the U.S. Government's) money.20 7 Rather than
withdrawing, the law firm continued to represent Reckmeyer throughout his
trial and lost $195,000 in legal fees.208
Similarly, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant was convicted in Missouri
federal district court for conspiring to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana.20 9 After being charged, defendant's family hired John Fahle, a
local defense attorney, to handle the proceedings.210  Following the
arraignment, the defendant enlisted the services of Joseph Low, a California
attorney, to either assist Fahle or to succeed him as sole counsel to the
defendant. 211 Low and Fahle appeared together in court at an evidentiary
hearing, shortly after which Gonzalez-Lopez informed Fahle that he wanted
only Low to represent him in the proceedings. 212  Low filed two
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (1983).
200. See id. at (b)(5)-(6).
201. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989).
202. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2006).
203. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986).
204. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987).
205. In re Forfeiture Hearing As to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th
Cir. 1988).
206. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 635.
207. Id. at 624-28; cf United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 723 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(holding that accepting attorney's fee advancements from employer does not disqualify Sixth
Amendment claim).
208. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 621.
209. Id. at 142.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
applications with the district court for admission pro hac vice;213 both
applications were denied without any explanation. 214 Low appealed the
second rejection, and his writ of mandamus was dismissed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 215  Fahle filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and concurrently petitioned for sanctions against
Low. 2 16 During this ancillary proceeding, Low was informed by the court
as to why he was denied pro hac vice: he was in violation of Missouri Rule
of Professional Conduct 4-4.2, which prohibited a lawyer from
communicating with a represented party about the subject of the
representation without the lawyer's consent. 217 Low, for the third time,
filed to be admitted pro hac vice; again he was denied.218 Gonzalez-Lopez
retained another attorney and went to trial, where a U.S. Marshal was
placed in between Low and the defense attorney, preventing Low from
continuing to break Rule 4-4.2 by communicating with the defendant.219
Gonzalez-Lopez was convicted. 220
The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction, finding that the court
misapplied Rule 4-4.2 and thus erroneously denied Low's admission and
Gonzalez-Lopez's counsel of choice.221 When it reached the Supreme
Court, the Court held that where there has been an erroneous deprivation of
the choice of counsel, proof of a violation is incomplete absent a showing
of prejudice. 222
In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
the right to the assistance of counsel.223 By his reasoning, a defendant
should not automatically have a conviction reversed due to a lower court's
erring in refusing to admit pro hac vice an attorney. 224 Justice Alito
advocated that a defendant should be required to demonstrate the outcome
of the trial was adversely affected by the quality of assistance that the
defendant received.225 Justice Alito's dissent reflects the philosophy that
the Ninth Circuit used in Lopez to reverse the indictment dismissal against
the defendant. 226
213. Pro hac vice "usu[ally] refers to a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice in a
particular jurisdiction but who is admitted there temporarily for the purpose of conducting a
particular case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1248.
214. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 142 (2006).
215. Id. at 142.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 142-43; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2 (1993).
218. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 143.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2005).
222. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
223. Id. at 153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 152-53.
225. Id. at 162.
226. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d. 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993).
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D. Government Memoranda, Prosecutors, and KPMG
1. The Holder Memo
The previous part discussed various violations of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. This section will discuss DOJ policies that are relevant to
the specific violations addressed in the Stein case. White collar crime was
becoming much more prevalent near the end of the twentieth century. The
Department of Justice attempted to offer guidance to its prosecutors by
circulating office advisories. On June 16, 1999, then-Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder227 issued Federal Prosecution of Corporations228
(Holder Memo) to the several U.S. Attorneys. This memorandum was
tantamount to a "how to guide" on prosecuting corporations and their
respective officers and employees. The Holder Memo laid the groundwork
for several sets of DOJ advisory guidelines, including the Thompson
Memo,229 the McNulty Memo, 230 and the Filip Memo, 231 all declared to be
the "progeny" of the Holder Memo. 232 According to Holder, this was in
response to white-collar defense attorneys' frustration over the lack of
formal guidelines in determining whether to indict corporations (i.e., their
clients). 233 However, this memorandum was signed and dated at least two
years before the advent of twenty-first century white-collar crime. 234
Holder reasoned that prosecutors are increasingly faced with the decision
whether to prosecute corporations. Holder obliged the prosecutors and
defense attorneys by memorializing eight considerations that federal
prosecutors' could rely on in determining whether to prosecute a
227. Eric H. Holder now serves as the Attorney General in the Obama Administration.
See Eric Lichtblau & John M. Broder, Aide to Obama Seen as Choice for Justice Post, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at Al.
228. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All
Component Heads and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo],
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
229. See infra Part I.D.2.
230. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter the McNulty
Memo]; see also John Power, Show Me the Money: The Thompson Memo, Stein, and an
Employee's Right to the Advancement of Legal Fees Under the McNulty Memo, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1205, 1237 (2007) (arguing that the worst thing to do under the McNulty Memo
is for a corporate employer to have an ad-hoc approach to fee advancement for its
employees).
231. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter the Filip Memo];
see also Eric Lichtblau, U.S. To Ease Pressure Tactic over Legal Help for Employees, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at C1; Benjamin E. Rosenberg, 'Kozlowski': Using Internal Probes
Against Employees?, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2008, at 4; Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The
Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far Enough?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2008, at 4.
232. See Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo/ (Dec. 13, 2006, 08:47 EST).
233. Id.
234. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(discussing cases such as Arthur Andersen, Enron, and Tyco).
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corporation. 235  Three of these points were particularly important: the
corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate with the government investigation, including
potentially waiving the corporate attorney-client and work-product
privileges; 236 the existence and adequacy of a corporation's compliance
program; 237 and the corporation's "remedial actions," including a
compliance program or the improvement of an existing one as well as
disciplinary action (against the culpable employees including termination),
payment of restitution, and cooperation with government agents. 238
2. The Thompson Memo
In late 2001 and continuing through 2002, many high profile companies
such as Enron and Tyco International found themselves facing potentially
companywide prosecution. 239 At the center of the Enron investigation and
subsequent prosecution was Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP.240 In
response to the public outcry over this onslaught of white collar crime,
President George W. Bush on July 9, 2002, established a Corporate Fraud
Task Force headed by Larry D. Thompson, the U.S. Deputy Attorney
General. 241 Six months later, Thompson issued Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations242 (Thompson Memo), a set of
guidelines that effectively revised the Holder Memo and became mandatory
for federal prosecutors. 243 While retaining much of the pertinent language
from its predecessor, the Thompson Memo discusses the protocol in
235. Holder Memo, supra note 228, § II.A.
236. Id. § VI. The Holder Memo discusses how a prosecutor should determine whether
or not the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees or agents. Such
support could occur through the advancing of legal fees, and may be considered when
determining the "extent and value of a corporation's cooperation." Holder Memo, supra note
228, § VI.B; cf Maya Krigman, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion of the Department of Justice
in Corporate Criminal Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 231, 265 (2008) (arguing that the best
solution to any potential request to waive corporate attorney-client privilege would be
preemptive legislation that would expressly prohibit such government misconduct).
237. Holder Memo, supra note 228, § VII.
238. Id. § VIII.
239. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
240. Id. Judge Lewis Kaplan goes on to note that Arthur Andersen collapsed following
the indictment, well before the case was tried. Id. However, in 2005 the Court reversed the
criminal conviction of Arthur Anderson due to faulty instructions to the jury. See Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005); see also Candace Zierdt & Ellen
S. Podgor, Back Against the Wall, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 34, 35; Charles Lane, Justices
Overturn Andersen Conviction, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005, at Al.
241. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
242. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson
Memo], http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_.guidelines.htm; see Dane C. Ball & Daniel
E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in the Corporate Criminal
Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REv. 229, 244 (2009).
243. Holder Memo, supra note 228, § II.A. The Thompson Memo contains nine factors
that a prosecutor should take into account, as opposed to eight considerations in the Holder
Memo. See Thompson Memo, supra note 242, § II.A.
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awarding deferred prosecution agreements to companies. 244  A deferred
prosecution agreement is a cooperation agreement, which is a form of
pretrial diversion that enables corporations to avoid firmwide prosecution
for its cooperation with government agencies and payment of a large
fine. 245
The Thompson Memo has received crushing criticism from courts and
commentators alike. 246 Even Eric Holder, the father of the modem day
white-collar DOJ guide, jokes that "Holder's [Memo] was good and
everything else was not as good. '247 The Thompson Memo was revised on
December 12, 2006, by then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
(McNulty Memo). 248 The McNulty Memo revised DOJ policy, including
how federal attorneys should weigh a corporation's cooperation in light of
fee advancement policies.249  The McNulty Memo provided that
"[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account whether a corporation
is advancing attorneys' fees to employees. '250
244. Thompson Memo, supra note 242, § VI.B ("[P]ermit[ting] a non prosecution
agreement in exchange for cooperation when a corporation's 'timely cooperation appears to
be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are
unavailable or would not be effective."' (quoting U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-27.600
(2009)); see also Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, "Monitoring"
Corporate Corruption: DOJ's Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35
AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 96-97 (2009) (noting that the increased use of deferred prosecution
agreements and nonprosecution agreements indicates the DOJ's perception that such
measures are sufficient in eliminating corporate corruption and the "ethos of corporate
America"); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through
the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2008) (arguing that courts need
to scrutinize deferred prosecution agreements and remove any improper terms that could
jeopardize the legality of the document).
245. See Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution Agreements:
What Is the Cost of Staying in Business?, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 11, June 3, 2005, at 1. At its
core, a deferred prosecution agreement is an official document that postpones prosecution,
while affording a corporation the opportunity to "clean house." See generally RUSSELL
MOKHIBER, EDITOR, CORP. CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF
DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.corn/deferredreport.htm; Zierdt & Podgor, supra note
244.
246. See, e.g., Ball & Bolia, supra note 242, at 246-48; Claudius 0. Sokenu, The Role of
Corporate Internal Investigations, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2008: PROSECUTORS AND
REGULATORS SPEAK 527 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-
1696, 2008); Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or
Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 422 (2005) (arguing that the Thompson Memo would
be more appropriate if federal prosecutors treated its factors as guidelines, which they were
intended to be, as opposed to a compulsory "battering ram"); Andrew Gilman, Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect of Congressional Intervention into
the Department ofJustice's Corporate Charging Policy, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1090-
93 (2008); Lauren E. Taigue, Note, Justice Department's Policy on Corporate Prosecutions
Under Attack: United States v. Stein Assails Thompson Memorandum, 52 VILL. L. REV.
369 (2007).
247. Lattman, supra note 232.
248. McNulty Memo, supra note 230; see also Ball & Bolia, supra note 242, at 254-57.
249. See generally Gilman, supra note 246.
250. McNulty Memo, supra note 230, at 11. "Many state indemnification statutes grant
corporations the power to advance the legal fees .... As a consequence, many corporations
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II. STEIN AND ITS CONFLICT WITH SIXTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW
Part I provided the background necessary for analyzing right-to-counsel
violations. Part II illustrates how Stein conflicts with current case law with
regards to when the right to counsel attaches, how defenses can be funded,
and what the appropriate remedy is for a right-to-counsel violation. Part
II.A.1 discusses the preliminary investigation of KPMG and the
communications between the company and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Part
II.A.2 details the three Stein cases in federal court that have had an
immediate impact on white-collar crime litigation and Sixth Amendment
interpretation. Part II.B. 1 analyzes the conflicts between Stein and federal
case law. Part II.B.2 details the immediate critiques of Stein by
practitioners and scholars alike.
A. KPMG v. The Department of Justice
1. Raising Eyebrows in Washington DC
In early 2002, the IRS began investigating potentially fraudulent tax
shelters 251 and issued nine summonses to KPMG, "which was less than
fully compliant. '2 52  Following investigations by the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, three senior KPMG partners, 2 53 who would later become
defendants in the Stein cases, testified before the Committee for public
hearings in November 2003.254 During the hearing, those who testified did
not appear honest or forthcoming. 255 KPMG, sensing the gathering storm
after the subpar performances of the three partners on The Hill,25 6 retained
the services of the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
(Skadden) to develop a cooperation strategy with the government in attempt
to avoid a firmwide prosecution. 257 One of the elements of this new
enter into contractual obligations to advance attorneys' fees .... Therefore, a corporation's
compliance with governing state law and its contractual obligations cannot be considered a
failure to cooperate." Id.
251. A tax shelter is a method by which to reduce current tax liability by offsetting the
income from one source from losses or deductions from another source. See IRS, Frequently
Asked Tax Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq/0,,id=199691,00.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009).
252. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
253. Jeffrey Stein, Richard Smith, and Jeffrey Eischeid were all reassigned at KPMG.
Stein was the deputy chair and chief operating officer of the firm; Smith was the vice chair
for tax services; and Eischeid was a partner in the personal financial planning practice.
Notably, Stein contracted to retire from the firm, with a three year consulting position worth
more than $3.6 million dollars over the term. Additionally, Stein and KPMG agreed that the
latter would bear the cost of an attorney "acceptable to both him and the firm or, if joint
representation were inappropriate or if Mr. Stein were the only party to a proceeding, by
counsel reasonably acceptable to Mr. Stein." Id. at 339.
254. Id. at 338-39.
255. Id.
256. See David Cay Johnston, Skeptical Hearing for Audit Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2003, at C3.
257. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
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cooperative approach would be to put distance between the firm and the
three senior partners who testified before the Committee. 258 In 2004, the
IRS made a criminal referral to the DOJ, which in turn delegated the matter
to the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Southern District of New
York.259
2. Communications Among KPMG, Skadden, and the U.S.
Attorney's Office
The USAO notified Skadden of the referral and an initial meeting was set
for February 25, 2004.260 In the days and weeks leading up to the meeting,
the USAO issued subject letters to several KPMG employees 261 informing
them that their practices at KPMG were within the scope of a grand jury's
investigation. 262  Skadden partner Robert S. Bennett, Assistant U.S.
Attorneys (AUSA) Shirah Neiman and Justin Weddle, as well as a number
of other counselors from each side attended the meeting. 263 Once the
meeting began and the semantics had ceased, AUSA Weddle expressly
inquired as to what KPMG's position was on the advancement of legal
fees.264 Mr. Bennett "tested the waters to see whether KPMG could adhere
to its practice of paying its employees' legal expenses," 265 by asking the
prosecutors what their perspective was. AUSA Neiman responded by
indicating that the government would take into account KPMG's legal
obligations but that the Thompson Memo had to be given consideration.266
Specifically, the Thompson Memo reiterates the language of the Holder
Memo regarding corporate cooperation and advancing legal fees: "while
cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a corporation's promise of
support to culpable employees and agents . . . through the advancing of
attorneys fees ... may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the
extent and value of a corporation's cooperation." 267 Representatives for
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 341.
261. Facts indicate that these letters were issued to between twenty and thirty KPMG
partners and employees. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Judge Kaplan found that before meetings with the USAO in February 2004, it
had been KPMG's unwavering policy to advance and pay legal fees for its partners,
principals, and employees, who through the scope of their employment, were involved in any
criminal, civil, or regulatory proceeding. This policy had never before included capped fees
or limitations on fee advancing. Id. at 340. Additionally, KPMG had recently paid $20
million to defend four of its partners in a criminal investigation and civil action brought by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the company's involvement with the
Xerox Corporation. Id.; see KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 51574, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 75,896, at 63,877 (Apr. 19, 2005).
266. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
267. Thompson Memo, supra note 242, § VI.B.
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KPMG indicated that it was the firm's practice to pay legal fees,268 but that
Delaware law permitted the company to do as it pleased.269 Skadden
attorneys declared that KPMG would not pay the fees for any employee
who declined to cooperate with the government investigation or who
invoked the Fifth Amendment. 270 AUSA Neiman responded, saying that
"'misconduct' should not or cannot 'be rewarded' [under] federal
guidelines." 271 This statement was construed by Skadden attorneys to mean
that any advancement of fees, beyond what was legally prescribed, could
count against KPMG if it was hoping to avoid firm-wide prosecution.272
On March 2, 2004, Bennett told AUSA Weddle that KPMG did not
necessarily believe that it owed a legal obligation to advance fees, but that
"'it would be a big problem' for the firm not to do so considering its
partnership structure.273
Following a conference call in which AUSA Weddle advised KPMG to
tell employees to be fully open with the investigation, even if that meant
admitting to criminal acts, Bennett issued a letter to each KPMG employee
targeted by the USAO informing them of KPMG's new Fee Policy.274
KPMG then issued a second memorandum, this time to nontargeted
employees, reiterating that those who were asked to meet with federal
prosecutors would have competent legal counsel and "reasonable fees" paid
for by the firm. 275 The USAO was disappointed by the "tone" of the
268. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56. KPMG is a Delaware limited liability
partnership whereby the partnership agreement is governed by the Delaware Revised
Partnership Statute Act. Id at 355 n.117.
269. "Subject to such standards and restrictions, if any, as are set forth in its partnership
agreement, a partnership may, and shall have the power to, indemnify and hold harmless any
partner or other person from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-110 (2008).
270. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
271. Id.
272. See id,
273. United States v. Stein (Stein k), 541 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Stein I,
435 F. Supp. 2d at 345).
274. "Fees and expenses would be [i] capped at $400,000 per employee; [ii] conditioned
on the employee's cooperation with the government; and [iii] terminated when an employee
was indicted." Stein V, 541 F.3d at 138 (citing Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345-46).
275. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346 n.62. For an interesting article on the vices of
advancing and subsidizing legal fees for corporate executives, see Peter Margulies, Legal
Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal
Courts, 7 U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J. 55, 74 (2006) (arguing that subsidization of executives' legal
fees "compounds agency costs and moral hazard, and conflicts with both legal ethics and
substantive law" (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who
Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991);
Sean Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of
Details Concerning Directors' and Officers'Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1147 (2006))). Professor Pamela Bucy argued that amidst corporate executives'
indemnification, even those who are found guilty, societal goals of fairness and crime
deterrence become "[l]ost in the shuffle." Bucy, supra, at 350. But see Stephen A. Radin,
"Sinners Who Find Religion "': Advancement of Litigation Expenses to Corporate Officials
Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 291 (2006) (arguing that there are some very
good reasons why mandatory legal fee advancement for corporate executives is a good thing,
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second memo and advised KPMG to encourage employees to "meet with
investigators without the assistance of counsel. '276 Skadden requested that
AUSAs notify them when a KPMG employee was not fully cooperating so
that the employee's legal fees could be cut off, his employment terminated,
or both. 2
77
After the matter passed to the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, James
Comey, Skadden's Bennett persisted with his assessment that KPMG had
been remarkably cooperative, as evidenced by KPMG's "pressure on
employees to cooperate by conditioning legal fees on cooperation." 278 On
August 29, 2005, KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
with the DOJ.279 In lieu of criminal prosecution, KPMG agreed to pay a
$456 million fine, to admit extensive wrongdoing, and to commit itself to
cooperating fully with any future government investigation or
prosecution. 280 On the same day, federal prosecutors indicted the first six
of the Stein Thirteen, 281 and, pursuant to the Fee Policy, KPMG
immediately ceased paying their legal fees.282 Then, on October 17, 2005,
the government filed a superseding indictment, adding thirteen more
defendants and totaling the criminal charges to include forty-six counts
spread among nineteen defendants for conspiracy to defraud the IRS, tax
evasion, and obstruction of internal revenue laws.283
including the fact that directors "solely by virtue of their job, face the potential of litigation
costs that are far disproportionate to the directors' fees they receive").
276. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also Robert J. Anello, Preserving the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: Here and Abroad, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv 291, 294 (2008)
(noting that while many defense attorneys complained about the coercive tactics of
government attorneys, very few actually held their ground against the government until after
the United States v. Stein decisions).
277. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 138-39 (citing Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347). For example,
Mark Watson and Richard Smith, two KPMG employees under investigation, consented to
attend proffer sessions only out of fear that KPMG would terminate their legal fees if they
did not oblige. Id. at 139 (citing United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 330-33
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Robert Bennett's letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office states, "'[w]henever
your [o]ffice has notified us that individuals have not... cooperat[ed], KPMG has promptly
and without question encouraged them to cooperate and threatened to cease payment of their
attorney fees and ... to take personnel action, including termination."' Id. (quoting Letter
from Robert Bennett, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to United States
Attorney's Office (Nov. 2, 2004)).
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50).
280. Id. (citing Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50).
281. Id. These employees were Jeffrey Stein, Richard Smith, Jeffrey Eischeid, Vice
Chairman of Tax Services John Lanning, Philip Wiesner, a former tax partner, and Mark
Watson, a tax partner. Id.
282. Id at 139-40 (citing Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350).
283. Id. at 139 n.4. The remaining defendants included Carol G. Warley, former tax
partner Larry DeLap, former tax partner and associate general counsel Steven Gremminger,
former partners Gregg Ritchie, Randy Bickham, and Carl Hasting, and former tax partner
and chief financial officer of KPMG Richard Rosenthal. Id. at 139.
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3. KPMG Defendants in Federal Court
On January 12, 2006, the defendants appeared in district court and filed a
collective motion to dismiss all indictments on the grounds that the
government improperly interfered with KPMG's position of advancing
legal fees, thus violating their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 284 On
March 30, 2006, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York asked the government if it was willing to
acknowledge that KPMG was free to use its independent business judgment
when determining whether or not to advance funds and, if the government
answered in the affirmative, that KPMG would not risk jeopardizing the
deferred prosecution agreement by potentially resuming fee
advancement. 285
The prosecutor responded, "That's always been the case, your Honor.
That's fine. We have no objection to that .... They can always exercise
their business judgment. As you described it, your Honor, that's always
been the case. It's the case today, your Honor." 286
a. Stein I
Described as the largest tax fraud case in history, Stein was "by no means
a garden-variety criminal case." 287  With that context in mind, Judge
Kaplan granted the motion to dismiss on June 26, 2006, drawing four
factual conclusions. 288 First, the Thompson Memo induced KPMG to
depart from its longstanding policy of unlimited fee advancement to
employees, which motivated KPMG attorneys to inquire in the very
preliminary stages of dialogue with the USAO whether this company policy
would be an issue.289 Second, the federal prosecutors repeatedly mentioned
federal guidelines as a way of "reinforc[ing] the threat inherent in the
Thompson Memo[]," meaning that the USAO could claim that KPMG was
being uncooperative by unconditionally advancing legal fees.290 Judge
Kaplan expressed concern not only with the Memo but with its author,
former Deputy AG Thompson, as well.291 Judge Kaplan recognized that a
defendant, either innocent or guilty, may incur substantial legal fees,
284. Id. at 140.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
288. Id. at 382.
289. Id. at 352.
290. Id. at 352-53.
291. Id. at 338. Judge Kaplan discussed comments by Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson in which the latter "defended pressuring companies to cut off payment of defense
costs for their employees on the ground that 'they [the employees] don't need fancy legal
representation' if they do not believe that they acted with criminal intent .... [S]uch a view,
[according to Judge Kaplan] would be misguided, to say the least." Id at 338 n.13 (quoting
Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against
Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at Al).
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especially in a complex corporate litigation: "defense costs in
investigations and prosecutions arising out of complex business
environments often are far greater than in less complex criminal
matters.... [E]ven the innocent need substantial resources to minimize the
chance of an unjust indictment and conviction. '292 Third, the government
intentionally behaved so as to minimize the role of defense attorneys.2 93
Fourth, had it not been for the conduct of prosecutors coupled with the
pressures of the Thompson Memo, KPMG would have paid defendants'
legal fees and expenses without consideration of cost. 294 Judge Kaplan
chastised the federal prosecutors, claiming that "[j]ustice is not done when
the government uses the threat of indictment ... to coerce companies into
depriving their present and even former employees of the means of
defending themselves against criminal charges in a court of law. '295
Judge Kaplan found that such interference violated the defendants' Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel.2 96 Citing to Wheat,2 97 Judge
Kaplan postulated that the constitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
extends to "an individual's right to choose the lawyer or lawyers he or she
desires." 298 Additionally, a defendant is allowed to mount the defense that
he or she chooses. 299 He further noted that "a lack of full cooperation by a
prospective defendant is insufficient to justify the government's
interference with the right of individual criminal defendants to obtain
resources lawfully available to them in order to defend themselves. '300
Affirming a defendant's right to use wholly legitimate funds to pay for
counsel and reasoning that these particular defendants' relied (to their
detriment) on KPMG's historical promise to pay fees and their consistent
practice of doing precisely that, Judge Kaplan found that "the legal fees at
issue now-were in every material sense, [the defendants'] property, not that
of a third party."'301 Additionally, Judge Kaplan held that there was no need
to exhibit prejudice caused by the Sixth Amendment violation because the
"right to be represented as [the employees] choose .... like a deprivation of
292. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.13.
293. Id. at 353; see also Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering
Pressure on White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 863-66 (2009)
(analyzing why litigation costs are so high in white-collar crime).
294. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
295. Id. at 381-82.
296. Id. at 382. While this Note will not directly focus on the Fifth Amendment
implications of the IPMG case, for a discussion of this issue, see generally Brandon L.
Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REv 917 (2008) (arguing that while
corporate compliance may not raise Fifth Amendment issues, it is in the firm's best interest
to adequately inform their employees prior to formal compliance interviews).
297. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
298. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
299. Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989)).
300. Id. at 369.
301. Id. at 367.
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the right to counsel of their choice, is complete irrespective of the quality30 2
of the representation they receive." 30 3
While he initially rejected the option of dismissal as a remedy, Judge
Kaplan invited the defendants to file a civil suit against KPMG. 304 This,
reasoned Judge Kaplan, would enable them to attain their promised legal
fees, curing the constitutional violation. 305 Judge Kaplan also suggested
several other potential alternatives.306
b. Stein IV 30 7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overruled Kaplan's
ruling on ancillary jurisdiction.30 8 The Second Circuit found that the
underlying issues in Stein I were constitutional issues arising out of
prosecutorial conduct and the Thompson Memo. 30 9 For Judge Kaplan to
claim federal jurisdiction over state contract claims and thus compel KPMG
to appear in a civil matter ancillary to a separate criminal matter would not
be appropriate, according to the appellate court, especially considering that
the constitutional remedy would be ascertained only if KPMG were found
guilty, and payment of fees would not be "an indispensable remedy and
may not even constitute a full remedy." 310 After being overruled by the
Second Circuit,3 11 Judge Kaplan officially dismissed the indictments for the
thirteen defendants on July 16, 2006.3 12 Judge Kaplan made findings that
302. See supra Part I.C.3.
303. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
304. id. at 379.
305. Id. at 380. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that Kaplan did
not have ancillary jurisdiction over the matter. See Stein v. KPMG LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d
Cir. 2007).
306. Judge Kaplan found that the way to cure the violation would be to have the
defendants' already incurred and future legal fees paid for. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
One obvious remedy would have been to have the government pay for the defense funds;
essentially, the government would pay for what it broke. Id. However, this was problematic
because the doctrine of sovereign immunity, absent a waiver by Congress, protects the
government from paying monetary damages. Id. at 374-75. There has been some debate in
other courts as to whether severe government misconduct can trump, and thus, pierce
sovereign immunity. Id. at 375. However, Judge Kaplan agreed with current jurisprudence
that supervisory powers are discretionary, while sovereign immunity is absolute and
impregnable. Id. at 375-76 (citing United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 767 (1st Cir. 1994)).
In addition to claiming personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a civil suit against
KPMG, Judge Kaplan advised that either through KPMG's initiative or through government
pressure via the deferred prosecution agreement, the firm could pay the legal fees. This
would have remedied, or at least "mitigated substantially," the government's
unconstitutional interference. Id. at 377-80.
307. To be clear, there were four respective Stein cases before the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The second and third matters are not at issue in this
Note.
308. Stein, 486 F.3d at 756.
309. Id. at 762.
310. Id. at 762-63.
311. Id. at 756.
312. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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four of the defendants were denied the counsel of their choice; and the
remaining nine, though not deprived of their choice of counsel, were
substantially limited by the government in their ability to mount the
necessary discovery and other pretrial mechanisms to prepare for trial. 313
Echoing Gonzalez-Lopez, the district court held that when one's choice of
counsel is wrongfully denied, the violation is complete, regardless of the
quality of the defense received.314
Judge Kaplan was reluctant to dismiss the indictments in Stein L
However, two events occurred since the initial proceeding that likely
swayed him to dismiss: First, the Second Circuit overruled him by finding
that the district court did not have ancillary jurisdiction to hear the civil suit
against KPMG. 315 Second, new evidence came to light before the court,316
including three important documents from a twenty-two million page
production in Stein IV.317 The first piece of evidence was a transcript of a
voicemail message left on February 18, 2004, by then-KPMG CEO Eugene
O'Kelly. 318  This message was delivered to all KPMG partners and
informed them that the firm had discovered that the USAO would be
launching an investigation and that any former or present employee asked
to appear before the prosecutors would be provided competent counsel at
the firm's expense. 319 Judge Kaplan found this particular piece of evidence
to illuminate the government's influence over KPMG's new Fee Policy. 320
Judge Kaplan reasoned that this voicemail, left seven days before the initial
meeting between Skadden and the USAO, indicated that KPMG had a clear
intent to advance legal fees prior to meetings with federal prosecutors.321
Judge Kaplan admonished the prosecutors' conduct, pronouncing that their
behavior "shock[ed] the conscience." 322
Given the district court's initial holding in Stein I, the government did not
oppose a motion to dismiss the indictments for the Stein Thirteen. 323 Even
so, Judge Kaplan performed an independent analysis and found that
313. Seeid. at 415-19.
314. Id. at 422. Judge Kaplan found that while a violation may be complete, it could still
be cured. For example, the defendant in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez was able to have a
retrial with his chosen attorney, thus curing the constitutional violation. Id; see also United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006).
315. See Stein, 486 F.3d at 764.
316. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at408.
322. Id. at 412-13.
323. Id. at 419. Some attorneys believe the government conceded defeat as a strategic
measure to have the case brought before the Second Circuit on appeal. See Andrew
Weissmann et al., District Court Dismisses Charges Against 13 Former KPMG Employees,
CLIENT ADVISORY (Jenner & Block LLP), July 23, 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFsl252%5CI 769
%5CDistrictCourtDismissesChargesAgainst_13_FormerK.PMGEmployees_0707.pdf.
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dismissal was proper.324 His analysis uncovered that four of the defendants
were deprived of their chosen counsel. 325 Judge Kaplan found that the
entire Stein Thirteen had been forced, due to KPMG's cutoff of payments,
to substantially curtail their defenses. 326 Judge Kaplan reasoned that by
virtue of KPMG's withholding of funds, any question of prejudice against
the defendants would have to be presumed.327 The court further indicated
that without KPMG's contributions, none of the Stein Thirteen could afford
their anticipated defenses. 328
Judge Kaplan, in a pointed conclusion, blamed the government for
allowing the Stein Thirteen to walk free.329  Forced to dismiss the
indictments, Kaplan explained he "reached this conclusion only after
pursuing every alternative . .. and only with the greatest reluctance. '330
The court recognized the charges that the Stein Thirteen faced, and
acknowledged that the merits of the case could have and should have been
decided. 331 The court explained that the USAO "deliberately or callously"
interfered unlawfully with legally obtainable funds that could have, and
should have, been used to mount the KPMG employees' defenses. 332 Such
illicit behavior, the court continued, was "intolerable in a society that holds
itself out to the world as a paragon of justice." 333 Judge Kaplan dictated
that no other remedy could place the defendants, none of whom could
personally finance their defenses, back in the situation they would have
been in absent government interference (i.e., using legally anticipated funds
to retain a lawyer and mount a viable defense). 334 Additionally, this
324. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
325. See id. at421-22.
326. See id. at 423.
327. Id.
328. Id. Mark Watson had assets of approximately $80,000 and owed his lawyers about
$1 million, which would be difficult to pay, considering he was fired. Id. Second, Carl
Hasting was insolvent at the time of Stein IV. Id. Third, Randy Bickham had less than
$300,000 in assets and owed his lawyers over $600,000, and his inability to pay these fees
led his attorneys to threaten him with a motion to withdraw as counsel. Id.; see MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 16(b)(5)-(6) (1983). While the other Stein defendants were
in better financial shape, with assets ranging from $1 to $5 million, the district court found
this irrelevant, as the most expensive part of litigation, the trial itself, had yet to happen.
Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423-25. The legal fees ranged from about $500,000 to about
$3.6 million per defendant. Id. at 423-24. Defense attorneys predicted that if the case
proceeded to trial, costs could reach anywhere from $7 to $24 million per defendant,
averaging about $13 million per defendant. Id. at 424.
329. Id. at 428.
330. Id. at 427.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 427-28.
334. Id. at 422-25. The government, despite conceding the dismissal of the thirteen
defendants, argued that they raised the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) as an alternative remedy.
See id. at 419-20. However, there are two reasons why this was not an adequate remedy:
First, the defendants' were not financially eligible for protection under the CJA upon
indictment, and thus would need to spend most of their assets in order to qualify. Second,
the CJA establishes a $7000 maximum fee for felony cases (though a judge may elect to
raise this fee under the appropriate circumstances), which raises concerns that attorneys
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remedy could be perceived as a punishment for the federal prosecutors, who
used their "life and death power over KPMG" to coerce its employees to
give into government pressures. Additionally, "the Constitution barred the
government from doing directly what it forced KPMG to do for it."'335
Consequently, the district court formally dismissed the indictment against
the Stein Thirteen. 336
c. The Second Circuit Affirms the Dismissals
On August 28, 2008, the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of
New York's ruling in Stein IV.337 Concurring with Kaplan's factual
findings from Stein I and Stein IV, Chief Judge Jacobs held, first, that
dismissal of the indictments would be necessary to cure any Sixth
Amendment violation by the government and, second, that KPMG's
adoption and enforcement of the Fee Policy was tantamount to state
action.338  Then, the Second Circuit calculated that the government's
preindictment conduct was not immune to the employees' right-to-counsel
claims. 339 Essentially, the government argued, perhaps in vain, that the
alleged violations occurred before any right to counsel was triggered, since
it would have occurred before the indictments.340 The problem with that
argument was that, viewed in an expansive light, the effects of the
government interference would violate the right to counsel once it attached
would be inclined to limit their defenses out of fear of nonpayment. Id. at 420-21. Kaplan
did not go as far as to say that the attorneys appointed under the CJA would not pass
constitutional muster under the Strickland test for effective counsel, but he found that this
remedy would not be the equivalent of what the defendants would have had, absent the
unconstitutional acts by the government. Id. at 421.
335. Id. at413-14.
336. See generally id While the government conceded the dismissal of the indictments
for thirteen defendants, prosecutors refused to dismiss the indictments against four other
defendants in the case, and Judge Kaplan agreed. Three of the four defendants, including
former tax employees Robert Pfaff and John Larson and former tax attorney Ray Ruble,
were found guilty of multiple counts of tax evasion. A fourth defendant, former KPMG
partner David Greenberg, was exonerated on all counts. See Lynnley Browning, 3 Convicted
in KPMG Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B 11.
337. Stein V, 541 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2008). Coincidentally, hours after the decision was
announced, Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip held a press conference at the New York
Stock Exchange to announce revisions to the McNulty Memo. See Filip Memo, supra note
231. Filip conveyed that unlike the previous McNulty Memo (where the DOJ reserved the
right to consider the advancing of attorney fees if it had a negative impact on the
cooperation), under the new operating guidelines fee advancement would only be scrutinized
in the rarest of situations where such advancement would rise to the level of criminal
obstruction of justice. See Filip Memo, supra note 231, at 12-13; see also McNulty Memo,
supra note 230.
338. Id. State Action is "[a]nything done by a government; esp[ecially], in constitutional
law, an intrusion on a person's rights (esp[ecially] civil rights) either by a governmental
entity or by a private requirement that can be enforced only be governmental action (such as
racially restrictive covenant, which requires judicial action for enforcement)." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 672.
339. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 153.
340. See id.
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following a formal criminal indictment. Last, the court affirmed that the
Stein Thirteen were each deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 341
The Second Circuit held that though "[d]ismissal of an indictment is a
remedy of last resort, '"342 it was appropriate given that, out of the thirteen
defendants, four lost their chosen attorneys. Also, all thirteen Stein
defendants had their defenses severely limited due to lack of financial
resources that would have been available to them absent the government's
violation of their constitutional rights.343 The government did this by
influencing KPMG to change its policy of advancing legal fees through the
Thompson Memo and prosecutorial influence, leading to a new Fee Policy,
which called for fee caps and limitations.344 The government argued that it
had cured the violation on March 30, 2006, when, in responding to an
interrogatory posed by Judge Kaplan, an AUSA responded that KPMG was
always free to use its business judgment as to whether or not to pay the
legal fees for its employees. 345 Neither Judge Kaplan nor the Second
Circuit was persuaded. The Second Circuit held that such an "isolated and
ambiguous statement in a proceeding to which KPMG was not a party (and
the nearly 16-month period of legal limbo that ensued) did not restore
defendants to the status quo ante." '346
Due to KPMG's unwavering history of paying legal fees for its
employees, there was no reason to believe it would completely change the
policy, especially given former KPMG Chief Executive Officer Eugene
O'Kelly's reassurance to employees that the firm would pay for their legal
fees presuming the pending government investigation.347 The Second
Circuit ruled that since the defendants expected to receive legal fees from
KPMG, the fees were essentially the defendants' property. 348 To prove
reliance on the fees, the KPMG defendants need not, according to the court,
make any showing of prejudice, since nearly every aspect of their defense
and strategy was influenced by the lack of funds they would have received,
but for the government's interference. 349 During oral arguments, the
government conceded that it was in its best interest that "every defendant
receive the best possible representation he or she can obtain. '350 However,
this would make little sense given that such representation may "stymie"
341. Id. at 135-36.
342. Id. at 144 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)).
343. See id. at 151 & n.10.
344. Id. at 143-44.
345. See id. at 140.
346. Id. at 145.
347. See United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
348. United States v. Stein (Stein P), 541 F.3d 130, 151 (2d Cir. 2008); cf Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634-35 (1989) (stating that abuse claims
need to be raised and evaluated on a case-by-case basis).
349. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 151; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
146 (2006) (holding that there was no need to demonstrate prejudice once the right-to-
counsel violation is complete).
350. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 157.
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prosecutors by facing worthy adversaries. 351 Additionally, as Judge Kaplan
pointed out, KPMG would not then want to pay the legal fees (as an
alternative remedy to dismissal of the indictments) as it had already paid
$456 million in fines under its deferred prosecution agreement and did not
wish to appear to cave under government pressure. 352
B. Stein Conflicts with Contemporary Jurisprudence
The Second Circuit's decision in Stein is the first case since 1979 in
which a federal court of appeals issued an order dismissing an indictment
for a right-to-counsel violation. 353 In United States v. Morrison,354 the
Third Circuit found that the defendant's right to counsel had been violated
and, regardless of any demonstration of prejudice at trial, that the defendant
was entitled to a dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.355 This legal
reasoning was not sufficient for the Supreme Court.356 However, in light of
the recent holding in Gonzalez-Lopez, determining that no prejudice was
required to cause a right-to-counsel violation where counsel was wrongly
disqualified, the Second Circuit may have current jurisprudence on its
side.357 The previous section laid out the specifics of the Stein cases. Part
II.B.1 analyzes how the Stein decisions are consistent with, yet at times
dissimilar to, existing federal court precedents. Part II.B.2 discusses some
of the early critiques and criticisms of the Stein decisions.
1. Is Stein Consistent with What Other Courts Have Done?
a. When Does the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Attach?
Kirby v. Illinois358 held that the right to counsel attaches once the
government has positioned itself to prosecute the defendant. 359 United
States v. Wade360 supplanted this decision by postulating that counsel
should be present at critical stages of the prosecution.361  The Second
Circuit agreed that while the right of counsel attaches after some initiation
of adversarial proceedings-such as, arraignment, indictment, or a
preliminary hearing-the inquiry does not end there. 362 The Second Circuit
endorsed Judge Kaplan's analysis, finding that, although defendants' rights
351. Id.
352. Id. at 145-46.
353. See United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
354. Id.
355. See id.
356. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 367 (1981) (holding that where a Sixth
Amendment violation has had no adverse impact on the defendant, dismissal of the
indictment is an inappropriate remedy).
357. Id. at 146.
358. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
359. Id. at 688-89.
360. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
361. Id. at 226-27.
362. United States v. Stein (Stein P), 541 F.3d 130, 153 (2d Cir. 2008).
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attached upon their indictment, the government's action preindictment
could have no other effect but to negate the funds that would have been
accessible to the defendants postindictment, in violation of the
Constitution.363  In United States v. Rosen,364 the Eastern District of
Virginia reasoned that if the government coerced a company into cutting off
the advancement of legal fees for its employees, and this interference was
purported to undermine the defendants' relationship with counsel
postindictment, the government had violated the defendants' right to
expend their own resources once the right to counsel attached. 365 This case
is similar to Stein because the district court found fee advancement to be the
property of the defendants to whom such aid was promised, as opposed to
the vested property interest of a third party.366 In contrast, the property at
issue in Caplin was illegally obtained and thus became frozen assets
through federal drug forfeiture laws.367 As such, the defendant no longer
had a proprietary right to allocate these funds to secure a defense because,
though he was in possession of some of the funds, he no longer had good
title after he committed the criminal violation. 368
b. Where Did the Violation Occur?
During oral arguments before the appellate court, the prosecution
submitted that it was in the government's best interest if every defendant
received the "best possible representation he or she can obtain. '369 The
Second Circuit found this to be a non sequitur, as the government could not
simultaneously leave the defendants "naked to their enemies," while also
wishing the same defendants had proper protection.370 The court decided
not to disturb Judge Kaplan's findings that four of the defendants, unable to
retain the counsel of their choice due to the new fee policy, were deprived
counsel of choice without justification. 371  There was no need under
Gonzalez-Lopez to show harm, as the right-to-counsel violation was
complete. 372 However, the government could have cured this violation but
did not.373 On appeal, the government claimed that it cured any alleged
violation when it reiterated that KPMG was free to use its business
363. Id. But see Maskay, supra note 100, at 523 (arguing that the court in Stein erred in
interpreting the attachment of the right to counsel preindictment because there is no Supreme
Court precedent on the matter and that such a finding "rests on a blanket assumption that the
government's actions will have a postindictment effect that is unconstitutional under the
Sixth Amendment").
364. United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 2007).
365. Id. at 733-34.
366. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
367. See id. at 620-22.
368. See id. at 624-29.
369. United States v. Stein (Stein P), 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 151 & n.10.
372. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
373. See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 136.
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judgment; the government did not confirm that KPMG's fee advancement
would not have a detrimental effect on its deferred prosecution
agreement. 374 The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
were not persuaded, and ruled that the violation was complete and
uncured. 375
The Second Circuit also affirmed that all thirteen of the Stein defendants
had their rights violated, as they were forced to limit the scope of their
defense due to insufficient funds. 376 The court found that the government
interfered with the defendants' right to counsel by causing KPMG to
impose a financial burden.377 Some could counter by saying that most
criminal defendants do not have access to endless funds to secure a not
guilty verdict. 378 The Second Circuit reasoned that these defendants were
indicted on a "fairly novel theory of criminal liability" when the discovery
contained more than twenty-two million documents and would require
expert witnesses to make sense of this complex litigation.379 The potential
lack of resources and adequate pretrial measures has been interpreted by at
least one court to be a Strickland test, that is, a query of ineffective
counsel. 380  In Rosen, the court discussed the potentially persuasive
presumption of prejudice in Stein, highlighting the millions of pages of
documents, the hundreds of depositions, and "an anticipated trial of such
length that some defense counsel could not even afford to attend ... let
alone prepare for it, absent fee advances." 381 If the Second Circuit meant to
make an impaired counsel argument, it begs the question, where is the
prejudice? 382 The district court in Rosen conceded that Stein was much
more complex than the case before it (two-count indictment against two
defendants), but the district court was skeptical of a per se rule that would
presume prejudice where the government interferes with a defendant's right
to use his resources. 383 In Cronic, the Supreme Court disposed of the Sixth
Amendment claim despite the complexity of the case, the lack of experience
of the defense attorney, and the limited time before the commencement of
the trial. 384 Justice Stevens repudiated these arguments, maintaining that
the claims did not amount to sufficient harm. 385 However, the case against
Harrison Cronic dealt with serious, though fairly simple, mail fraud
374. Id. at 145.
375. See id.
376. See id. at 151.
377. See id.
378. See Lee, supra note 60.
379. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 157. The Second Circuit estimated the length of the criminal
trial being between six and eight months. Id.
380. See United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 734 (E.D. Va. 2007).
381. Id. at 735.
382. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that the second
prong of the ineffective counsel test requires a showing that the attorney in question
prejudiced the defense).
383. See Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35.
384. See id. at 662-65.
385. See id. at 666.
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charges,386 as opposed to the complex issues present in a corporate
litigation case such as Stein.
c. Is the Dismissal of an Indictment Consistent with Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Court Case Law?
As previously noted, only one other appellate court has decided to
dismiss an indictment due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in the last thirty years. 387 In Morrison, the Court quickly disposed
of the Third Circuit's mandate, finding that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the sole communication she had with federal agents.388
However, "courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each
case when reviewing such claims. '389 Clearly the Stein cases present
different issues for debate, as the crux of the violations stemmed from the
government's interference with attorneys' fees. However, in the case of the
four defendants denied the counsel of their choice, their remedy is more
consistent with the Court's ruling in Gonzalez-Lopez, since their inability to
retain their counsel of choice is a completed violation, and one that was not
cured by the government. In Gonzalez-Lopez, retrial would not be unduly
prejudicial to the defendant, as his violation would be cured: he could
proceed to trial with his chosen attorney. 390  The sine qua non of
constitutional violations is putting the defendant back in the status quo
ante.391 The four Stein defendants lacked the financial means to acquire the
services of the attorneys they would have hired but for the cutting off of
attorneys' fees. 392
The remedy for a constitutional violation must be one that "as much as
possible restores the defendant to the circumstances that would have existed
had there been no constitutional error. '393 While it is irrefutable that
dismissal of an indictment is a worst case scenario, it is not improper. In a
student note published in the Harvard Law Review shortly after the decision
in Morrison, the author asserted that while courts may in some cases find
dismissal wholly inappropriate, it is recognized that occasionally it may be
necessary. 394 When determining an alternative remedy to dismissal, courts
need to focus on the remedial effect on the individual defendant.395 Here,
the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit found that there
was no way to place the Stein Thirteen back into the legal and financial
386. See id. at 664-65.
387. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
388. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 (1981).
389. Wessell, supra note 181, at 533.
390. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
391. This is as opposed to punishing government misconduct, which is generally reserved
to the courts through their federal supervisory powers. See supra Part I.A.2.
392. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
393. United States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000).
394. See Government Intrusions, supra note 122, at 1159.
395. See id.
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situations they would have been in absent the government harm. 396 Recall
that some of them were insolvent; 397 none of them would have been able to
sustain a lengthy and expensive trial without the legal fees upon which they
relied.398 Judge Kaplan struggled with the notion of dismissing these
indictments and searched for plausible alternatives. He recognized that a
jurist must act "to ensure the integrity of the adversary system of criminal
justice as well as to punish the guilty"; however, these twin aims are "often
difficult to reconcile." 399
2. Critiques of Stein
The Second Circuit's historic decision will have some effect on the legal
and corporate communities in this country for the foreseeable future. The
question is whether the Second Circuit's holding will have sweeping
ramifications, or be confined to the facts of the case. Unsurprisingly,
practitioners and scholars immediately voiced their reactions to this
decision. 400
This ruling in Stein will have an effect on legal practitioners.40 1 This
decision coupled with the Filip Memo will require federal prosecutors to
temper any aggressive conduct.40 2 Several major law firms have released
statements and legal clarifications since Stein and the Filip Memo. The
general consensus seems to be that, while Stein is an important decision, it
is limited to its particular facts: "a situation in which the government
actually coerced an organization, and the organization's employees had a
legitimate property interest in the item withheld (advancement of legal
fees). '40 3 This is an interesting way to look at Stein, as it conjures up
images of general corporate practices and policies as well as Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Legal fee advancement and indemnification of corporate
executives has been described as the "mainstay of corporate life for the last
fifty years. '404 If the Filip Memo is able to reel federal prosecutors in, so
that they do not consider legal fee advancement when determining
corporate cooperation, it is unlikely that a Stein case will occur again.40 5
396. See supra Part II.A.2.a-c.
397. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
398. See id.
399. See Government Intrusions, supra note 122, at 1161.
400. As of October 5, 2009, only one other court has cited Stein V, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.
2008). In S.E.C. v. Dunn, 587 F. Supp. 2d 486, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the defendant
failed to draw a parallel between that case and Stein V, in pursuit of relief for a state action
claim.
401. See infra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
402. See Dan Small, Attitude Adjustment, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 2008, at 23.
403. Robert J. Kipnees & Khizar A. Sheikh, The Investigation and Prosecution of
Business Organizations, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2008, at 49.
404. Margulies, supra note 275, at 56.
405. See Stuart Altman & Sujit Raman, Major Developments in Corporate Criminal Law:
Department of Justice Issues New Corporate Charging Policy and Second Circuit Court of
Appeals Upholds Dismissal of Indictments in KPMG Fees Case, LITIGATION ALERT (Hogan
& Hartson LLP, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2008, available at
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However, "[o]nly time. will tell whether the Filip Memo and the lessons of
the Stein decision will result in greater respect for a company's need.. . [to]
determine appropriate levels of employee indemnification, discipline and
communication during a government investigation." 40 6
According to Robert Kipness and Khizar Sheikh, attorneys from
Lowenstein Sandler PC, companies may change the way in which they
balance the risks of indictments, deferred prosecution agreements or
nonprosecution agreements, plea bargains, and trials.40 7 Stein and the Filip
Memo warn corporate attorneys of the potential dangers in not retaining
competent legal counsel at the start of any government inquiry. Such
counsel will be tasked with formulating a strategy, and will gauge how
willing the corporation should be in its cooperation with the government or
regulatory agencies. 408
In an early response to the Thompson Memo and the Stein decisions,
Rebecca Walker of Kaplan & Walker LLP, envisioned several
consequences. 40 9 First, the way in which a company handles the suspected
misconduct of its employees is critical, from establishing effective whistle-
blowing procedures to disciplining the actors. A second option for
companies would be to reconsider their policies or bylaws pertaining to fee
advancement. 4 10
Laurence Urgenson and Audrey Harris of Kirkland & Ellis LLP argue
that the Second Circuit's decision likely will require the government,
employers, and corporate counsel to reflect on the implications of Stein on
internal investigations and cooperation with government agents.411 This
decision also enables corporate counsel to ask previously difficult questions
about whether cooperation would cause a constitutional violation of
employees' rights. 412
Legal bloggers alike have lionized the district and circuit court decisions.
Professor Eugene Volokh posted to his legal and political weblog, The
Volokh Conspiracy, that he concurred with the courts' judgments regarding
wholly legitimate funds: "Constitutional rights generally ... include the
rights to pay for what it takes to exercise the right-to pay for counsel....
They likewise include the rights to pay for what it takes to exercise the right
http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/e4934a69-9b47-4167-83b0-6bad5aa2277c/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/66b22bd4-4598-4897-a727-7446a4628597/Lit.pdf.
406. See Stein & Levine, supra note 231, at 9.
407. See Kipnees & Sheikh, supra note 403.
408. Id.
409. Rebecca Walker, The Thompson Memo: Implications of the Stein Decision for
Corporate Compliance, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS INSTITUTE 2007 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1595, 2007), WL 1595 PLI/CoRP
483.
410. Id. at 495.
411. Audrey L. Harris & Laurence A. Urgenson, Is the White-Collar Defense Attorney
Headed for Extinction?, Bus. CRIMES BULL., May 2006, at 1.
412. Id.
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using money donated by friends, family, well-wishers, or others."413
Professor Volokh went on to say that while it was certainly true that KPMG
could have voluntarily decided not to front legal costs, the defendants'
constitutional rights were only jeopardized when the government asked for
cooperation and mandated that such cooperation would be dependent on the
advancing of attorneys fees to employees. 414 Another legal blog stated that
contrary to what many think, the government did not lose the Stein case.
The government's position, adverse to popular belief, was that it had won:
"[wihen justice is done for all, as is reflected in [the Second Circuit]
opinion-the prosecution, defense, and society win[]." 415 John Savarese of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, while perhaps agreeing in sentiment with
his fellow blogger, found the Stein case to represent "a decisive victory to
the defendants in this high-profile matter."416
Stein is a fascinating case because, while it was decided on constitutional
grounds, it may have long-term effects not only on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, but potentially on constitutional remedies. The decisions
have already shaped DOJ policy, attorney strategy, and white-collar
investigations and litigation. The chief conflict within this Note is how to
reconcile Stein with the right to counsel and constitutional remedy cases
before it.
III. RECONCILING STEIN AND MOVING ON
Stein, described as a "'prodefendant' development[], ' 417 has already had
a major impact on how the DOJ determines whether to prosecute a
corporation and its employees. Judge Kaplan's opinion in Stein I reportedly
led the DOJ to revamp the Thompson Memo, resulting in the McNulty
Memo. 418 Subsequently, the DOJ modified the McNulty Memo so that
legal fee advancement is no longer considered to be a factor in determining
a corporation's cooperation with a government investigation.419 However,
what is truly fascinating is the potential effect the Stein decisions will have
on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well as constitutional remedies.
413. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_08_24-2008_08_30.shtml (Aug. 29, 2008, 1:41
EST).
414. Id.
415. Posting of Ellen S. Podgor to White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2008/08/commentary-on-s.html
(Aug. 28, 2008).
416. Posting of John F. Savarese to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance & Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2008/09/28/us-v-
stein/ (Sept. 28, 2008, 12:18 EST).
417. Rosenberg, supra note 231.
418. Lichtblau, supra note 231; see Taigue, supra note 246, at 403-06.
419. See Filip Memo, supra note 231.
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A. How Does Stein Confront, or Hide from, Doctrinal Ambiguities?
1. The Right to Counsel Attaches When?
Consistent with Judge Kaplan's decisions, the Second Circuit held that
the right to counsel attached upon commencement of formal adversarial
proceedings.4 20 In Stein, the indictments of the defendants constituted
formal adversarial proceedings. 42 1 However, as the district court found,
and the Rosen court agreed, "pernicious effects" at the preindictment stages
can have a latent effect on the postindictment proceedings. 4 22 In fact, by
influencing KPMG to adopt its current fee policy, the government made it
impossible for the defendants not to be harmed because once the defendants
were indicted, their fees would be terminated. 423
While this proposition may make logical sense, no statute or Supreme
Court case supports it.424 In Rosen, the district court held that constitutional
violations that occurred before an indictment could create constitutional
violations postindictment. 42 5 However, Rosen is a case arising in a district
court in Virginia, not in the Second Circuit.4 26
This Note argues that the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit were correct in this regard. In fact, courts across the country should
take a very serious look at this expansive interpretation of when the right to
counsel attaches. At its core, the right to counsel is about the preservation
of the adversarial process. 427 The government conceded at oral argument
before the Second Circuit that it was in its best interest that all defendants
obtain the best possible representation they could.428  Despite this
statement, the prosecutors did everything they could to minimize the role of
defense counsel.4 29
When the prosecutors' conduct prior to the indictments impaired the
defendants' relationships with their attorneys postindictment, "the pre-
indictment actions ripen[ed] into cognizable Sixth Amendment deprivations
upon indictment. '4 30 It is contradictory to society's notion of justice to
reward government malfeasance simply because it occurs before any formal
indictment. In cases like Stein, where the government has done what it can
to handicap the attorney-client relationship, such pervasive acts should not
be tolerated, and courts need to not "enable the government," which
controls when an indictment will be made, to "hobble an individual's post-
420. United States v. Stein (Stein P), 541 F.3d 130, 152 (2d Cir. 2008).
421. Id.
422. Id. at 153.
423. Id.
424. See Maskay, supra note 100, at 523.
425. Id. at 733-34.
426. See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 153.
427. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
428. See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 157.
429. Id. at 141.
430. Id. at 153.
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indictment ability to retain counsel of choice" by exerting undue influence
over the defendant's employer.431
2. The Faulty Rationale Behind Determining Constitutional Violations
To clarify, in Stein two distinct constitutional arguments can be made:
the first, on behalf of the four defendants who were denied their counsel of
choice; the second, on behalf of the remaining nine defendants, whose
defenses were handicapped due to the limited available funds. 432
For the four defendants whose right-to-counsel violations derived from
the total loss of their chosen counsel, the violation of their rights is more
grounded in the law than it is for the remaining nine defendants. In
Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court found that once a counsel of choice has been
erroneously disqualified, the constitutional violation is "complete. '433
Unlike in Gonzalez-Lopez, where the district court fumbled an attorney
application for pro hac vice,434 the counsel for each of the four Stein
defendants were not explicitly disqualified by the court, but they were
indirectly disqualified by the government's interference with KPMG's fee
policy. Recall, in Wheat, the Court found that a defendant may hire an
attorney he can lawfully afford or, alternatively, who will provide legal
services absent such fee. 435 Unfortunately for these four defendants, their
chosen attorneys did not donate their services free of charge. 436 The
violation of these four defendants' rights to counsel was properly judged
"complete." 437
As for the other nine defendants, the courts held that their rights to
counsel had been violated because their defenses were severely limited
where, but for the government interference, they would not otherwise have
been.438 While Judge Kaplan recognized that not every criminal defendant
is constitutionally required to have the "Dream Team" 439 of defense
lawyers, those who are fortunate to have some other entity pay for their
legal expenses, as KPMG did in the Xerox case, 440 are entitled not to have
that interfered with by the government. 441 This basic principle makes
sense. It is permissible to use one's own funds to secure an attorney and a
defense strategy.442 In addition to the property argument to be made (that
the Stein Thirteen had a property right in the yet-to-be-advanced legal fees),
431. United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 (E.D. Va. 2007).
432. See United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
433. Id. at 146.
434. See supra note 213.
435. See id. at 159.
436. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
437. Id, at 422 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006)).
438. Id. at 418-19.
439. Id. at 425.
440. Id. at 408 ("The Xerox investigation.., was the criminal and SEC investigation in
which KPMG spent over $20 million on the individual defenses of four of its personnel.").
441. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
442. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989).
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corporate executives are constantly advanced and indemnified for their
legal fees, 44 3 in some cases even when they are found guilty.44 4
3. The Remedy Problem
Having found a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
issue then becomes, what to do next? The courts here have operated under
the general theory of Sixth Amendment violations such that "remedies
should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional
violation." 445 In the Second Circuit, the caveat is that the remedy must-as
much as possible-restore the defendant to the circumstances that would
have existed in the absence of the constitutional violation.446 For the four
defendants, the proper remedy was the dismissal of the indictments. In
Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant could have had his violation cured through
reversal and a trial with his chosen attorney, who had previously been
wrongfully excluded from representing his client.447 So, while the violation
was complete upon disqualification, it was still able to be cured.448 Here,
the four defendants had already been to court four times (not including
arguments before the Second Circuit) and two and a half years had gone by.
The government at no point cured the violation, which it could have. 449
The Second Circuit and the Southern District of New York found that the
oral statements made by the AUSA on March 30, 2006, did not cure the
violation.450 Even though federal prosecutors conceded KPMG was always
free to use its business judgment, the government failed to acquiesce or
even directly respond when asked whether KPMG's deferred prosecution
agreement would be in jeopardy if they advanced attorneys fees.451 Had the
prosecutors done that, it is possible that the government may have cured the
violation by permitting access to funds. The Second Circuit found that such
a declaration, absent KPMG, a necessary party, would be in vain. 452 Also,
it is possible the damage was already done.
At that point they had already expended $456 million in fines, in addition
to fines and legal fees for their involvement in the Xerox matter.453 The
likelihood is that the resources KPMG may have once had to devote to
defense funds no longer exist. Essentially, these four defendants cannot be
made whole again. Absent paying their debts and continuing to pay their
expensive legal fees, which KPMG is under no obligation to do, these
443. See Margulies, supra note 275, at 56.
444. See Bucy, supra note 275, at 350.
445. United States v Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
446. United States v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2000).
447. See United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
448. See United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).
449. Id.
450. Cf id. at 145.
451. Id.
452. See id.
453. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
see also supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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defendants cannot be made whole. 454 Even if the defendants could retain
funded counsel through the Criminal Protection Act,455 the court-appointed
lawyer could be the next Clarence Darrow, but, following the close of the
trial, he will not indemnify Mr. Watson for the nearly $1 million he already
owes his previous attorney. 456
The situation with the remaining nine defendants, those who are still
represented by their chosen counsel, is more complex. While these
defendants claim government interference, it would appear that their biggest
issue at trial would be mounting a defense. The potential remedy for them
could be to appoint counsel and funds through the court.457 The defendants
might then argue this would be on its face ineffective counsel, since there
could be no way that a court appointed lawyer could devote six to eight
months on the matter, cipher through twenty-two million pages of
documents, and interview the expert witnesses. 458 And truth be told, these
defendants would probably be right. Regardless, the defendants still would
have been deprived of the funds they were entitled to because of the
government interference. 459 However, the district court in Rosen did not go
so far as to establish a per se rule presuming ineffectiveness. 460 The Rosen
court also dealt with fee advancement, and the defendants claimed an
inability to mount the defense they would have been entitled to had they
received the fees they expected. But the court found that there was no
evidence of ineffective counsel as their representatives argued zealously
and competently on their behalves.461 While this evidence did not exist in
Stein, and while the court in Rosen refused to pass judgment on the
complexity of the Stein case, 462 the court resisted a presumption of
prejudice. That being said, Stein was no "garden-variety criminal case." 463
While it is difficult in Stein to reconcile the dismissal of an indictment, it
is unlike Cronic, where the charge was mail fraud, or Rosen, with two
indictments for two defendants. Stein is flooded with millions of pages in
documents, hundreds of witnesses, and an estimated trial length of up to
454. See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 144-46.
455. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006); see United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d
390, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
456. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
457. One area of recourse might be through the Criminal Justice Act. See 18 U.S.C. §
3006A (2006).
458. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407. However, Judge Kaplan did not make a ruling
on whether court appointed counsel would meet the constitutional requirements of effective
counsel. Id. at 421.
459. See id. at 407 n.156.
460. See United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731-34 (E.D. Va. 2007).
461. See id at 734-36.
462. The court in Rosen described Stein as "a '19 defendant, 46 count superseding
indictment charg[ing] what has been called the largest criminal tax case in United States
history' .... involv[ing] millions of pages of documents and hundreds of depositions." Id. at
735 (quoting United States v. Stein, No. S105 CRIM 0888(LAK), 2005 WL 3071272
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005)).
463. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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eight months.464 Additionally, we can all draw solace from the legal
reasoning in Morrison, which held that the dismissal of an indictment is
"plainly inappropriate" unless there is a showing of "demonstrable
prejudice, or substantial threat thereof."'465 Even if these nine defendants
could not show actual prejudice under Morrison, the threat that they would
be prejudiced by the government's interference with their rights to mount a
defense is a sufficiently substantial threat.466
4. Alternative Remedies
The government argued that it cured any and all right-to-counsel
violations when it conceded during oral arguments that it had always been
the USAO's policy to allow KPMG to exercise its business judgment. 467
However, seven days before representatives of KPMG met with the
AUSAs, KPMG CEO Eugene O'Kelly informed the partners that all current
and former employees of the company would be represented by competent
legal counsel at the firm's expense. 468 Mr. O'Kelly made this declaration
having been informed that a criminal referral was made to the USAO. 469
This statement and the firm's unvarying policy of paying legal costs for its
employees does not necessitate capping and terminating fee advancements.
Seeing that the dismissal of the indictments is such a final, definitive
remedy, it begs the question of what the government could have done to
prevent the dismissals other than not commit an injustice in the first place.
One possibility might have been to draft a nonprosecution agreement
with KPMG before Stein IV.470 By doing so, the government could still
have collected the $456 million dollar fine and have the company assume
liability for the fraudulent tax practices. This was a viable option for the
government. 471 In light of the removal of top personnel at KPMG who
were involved in the tax shelters and KPMG's proven "cooperation," the
government should have pursued this course. This would arguably cure any
constitutional claims the Stein Thirteen would have against the government;
it would also put the ball in KPMG's court by opening it up to a potential
civil claim from the defendants on either a tort or contract theory.
However, despite all of this, the courts may have reached another
conclusion with regards to the remedy.
One such conclusion, as mentioned, would be for the defendants to
proceed with their trials. For those who have or would have lost their
464. See United States v. Stein (Stein k), 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
465. Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 361-62.
466. See Stein V, 541 F.3d at 157-58.
467. Id. at 140.
468. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d. 390, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
469. Id.
470. See MOKHIBER, supra note 245. A nonprosecution agreement occurs when a
prosecutor agrees not to criminally prosecute the corporation in exchange for a payment of a
fine, cooperation, and changes in the corporate structure. Id
471. See generally Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 244.
[Vol. 78
STEIN THIRTEEN
attorneys, the court could appoint representation for indigent defendants. 472
However, the law is likely on the side of the defendants and the courts here.
Though the Second Circuit did not distinguish between the four and nine
respective Stein defendants the way that the district court chose to, the Stein
Thirteen's constitutional violations were complete when the government
interfered with their rights to chosen counsel and to mount the defense of
their choosing. 473 Since the government did not cure this defect, either by
exerting pressure or paying the defendants' fees, the only way in which to
put the defendants back in the position they would have been absent the
government interference would be dismissal of the indictments.474
While KPMG successfully avoided companywide prosecution, which of
course was its goal, it did not help its employees or the government
investigation with its vague and weak-willed responses regarding fee
advancement and indemnification. There may have been two ways in
which KPMG could have avoided the headache. First, corporations should
have an indemnification policy through which the company would agree to
reimburse legal fees for its employees unless an employee is found guilty or
liable, the company is released from indemnification.475 Every state has a
statute for corporate indemnification. 476 These are default rules and, like
most things, could have been contracted around. Another alternative would
be for corporations to put the fee-advancement policy in employment
contracts. 477 That way when the USAO inquired about the fee policy,
KPMG could have said it was under contractual obligations, without being
perceived as uncooperative. In the February 25, 2004, meeting between
KPMG's lawyers and the AUSAs, the issue of fee advancement became
relevant only because KPMG did not necessarily have a legal obligation to
advance fees-it was only corporate practice and policy.478 It is probable
that even if the firm paid the Stein Thirteen's legal fees, which they would
have been legally obligated to pay in the first place, KPMG could still have
fully cooperated and allowed the government access to its employees. 479
472. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(2006).
473. See United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2008).
474. Id. at 146.
475. See generally Bucy, supra note 275.
476. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
477. See Power, supra note 230, at 1208.
478. See Margulies, supra note 275; see, e.g., Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340-45.
479. See Thompson Memo, supra note 242, § VII, VI.B n.4 ("Obviously, a corporation's
compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate."). Had
KPMG expressly included fee advancement and indemnification clauses in their
employment contracts, under the existing DOJ guidelines, they wouldn't be breaking any
laws or considered uncooperative with the government, since they would be contractually
obligated to abide by the contracts.
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B. "Where We're Going, We Don't Need Roads ": What Does the Future
Hold Post-Stein?
In light of the Filip Memo, the consensus among scholars and
practitioners is that another case like Stein is unlikely to ever be decided
again.480  If the corporations and the prosecutors stick to the new
guidelines, such a case never should. 481 Government attorneys, at least
those prosecuting white-collar crime in the Southern District of New York,
will likely tone down their unfettered aggression, in light of Judge Kaplan's
warning. As one commentator put it, it's time for an "attitude adjustment"
for federal prosecutors. 482  Additionally, in December 2008, federal
prosecutors abstained from petitioning the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari. 483 This move underscores government disappointment at the
outcome of the Stein Thirteen decisions. However, federal prosecutors did
receive an early holiday present with the convictions of three remaining
defendants, coupled with the two previous KPMG employees that took plea
bargains, raising the total to five out of nineteen convictions from the
KPMG case.484
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important thing to understand is that in 2009, in light of
Stein, the cure for a violation of the constitutional right to counsel must be
matched to the wrong. The dismissal of the indictments was not a remedy
predicated on caprice or shaky law. Judge Kaplan did what he could to
prevent dismissing the indictments. He opted for a less restrictive remedy
in trying to attain ancillary jurisdiction so that he could hear a civil claim
against KPMG, which could have cured the government's violation.
However, this ruling was overturned by the Second Circuit. The Stein
decisions take an expansive view on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
specifically, when the right to counsel attaches, as well as constitutional
remedies. While it is possible, as some scholars suggest, that the Second
Circuit holding in Stein will be limited to its facts, the case represents the
straw that broke the camel's back for violations of the Sixth Amendment
rights of employees of corporations. Additionally, there is no telling what
long-term ramifications the holding can have on constitutional remedies,
especially considering that the Supreme Court will not have the chance to
either affirm or deny the remedy A la Morrison.
480. See supra Part II.B.2.
481. See supra Part II.B.2.
482. See Small, supra note 402.
483. See Efrati, supra note 3.
484. See Browning, supra note 336.
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